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JUDICIAL INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE 
SCOPE OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN  
U.S. AND CHINESE COURTS 
Jian Zhou† 
Abstract:  The New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards has been praised as one of the most efficient and powerful 
multilateral legal instruments in promoting international commercial arbitration.  The 
implementation of the Convention, however, depends heavily on the domestic legal 
mechanisms of contracting states.  By strategically adjusting its scope, local courts may 
expand or limit the benefits of the Convention in a significant way.  The comparison 
between the practices of United States and Chinese courts present two extreme examples 
of this scope issue.  There is considerable room to improve the domestic implementation 
of the Convention in both countries.  Comparison of the two countries also reveals that 
appropriate domestic judicial intervention on the scope of application is required in order 
to secure the benefits offered by the Convention.   
I. INTRODUCTION 
Arbitration has become a popular alternative dispute resolution 
avenue, both domestically and globally.  Arbitration is praised for its speed, 
the autonomy it provides to parties, the arbitrators’ technical expertise, the 
confidentiality of proceedings, and its relatively low cost.1  When the setting 
for commercial dispute resolution is international, arbitration precludes the 
uncertainty of procedures in foreign courts.  This is especially attractive for 
Western investors in commercial disputes involving developing countries of 
different cultures and conflicting political ideologies, such as Communist 
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1
  See generally Welber Barral & Frederico Cardoso, Global Developments: The New Brazilian 
Arbitration Act: A Firm Step Forward, 5 CROAT. ARBIT. Y.B. 81 (1998). 
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China.2  Enforcing arbitral awards in a foreign country is also much more 
practical than enforcing a court judgment due in large part due to the New 
York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral 
Awards (“New York Convention” or “Convention”).3 
The New York Convention offers a powerful instrument for enforcing 
arbitration agreements and arbitral awards among its 130 plus contracting 
parties.4  It requires each contracting state to recognize and enforce arbitral 
awards entered in the territory of another state, as well as those awards that a 
contracting state considers non-domestic awards.5  It also requires 
contracting states to recognize written arbitration agreements.6   To benefit 
from the Convention, an arbitration proceeding must fall within the 
Convention’s scope.  Although the Convention’s drafters strove for an 
unambiguous compromise among different legal systems, the 
implementation of the Convention in domestic courts differs dramatically 
from one country to another and, in some cases, from one court to another 
within the same country.7   
In recognizing and enforcing awards that fall under the scope of the 
Convention, contracting states are required to apply the criteria set forth 
therein.8  Unfortunately, as a result of compromises among nations, the 
scope of the Convention is not clearly defined.  Ambiguity of language in 
the Convention, discrepancies in legal concepts, and judicial discretion give 
                                           
2
  See generally Shin-yi Peng, The WTO Legalistic Approach and East Asia: From the Legal Culture 
Perspective, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 13 (2000) (discussing the legal cultural differences between East 
Asian countries and the West, and introducing traditional Chinese legal culture).   
3
  New York Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 
1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 [hereinafter New York Convention].  As of January 2004, the New 
York Convention had 136 contracting members, including all major economies in the world.  A list of the 
members is available at U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958-Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_ 
texts/arbitration/NYConvention_status.html (last visited June 1, 2006).  For a historical background of the 
New York Convention, see JULIAN D.M. LEW, LOUKAS A. MISTELIS & STEFAN M. KROLL, COMPARATIVE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 20-22 (2003).  Due to the lack of an effective multilateral 
judicial assistance treaty, enforceability of a judgment in a foreign country is very limited.  For example, 
there is no binding international judicial assistance treaty that commonly applies to both China and the 
United States.  A judgment from a foreign court will be considered as factual evidence in evaluating the 
entire case in a U.S. court if there is no binding judicial assistance agreement on judgment enforcement 
between the foreign country and the United States. 
4
  A list of the members is available at U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958-
Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, supra note 3. 
5
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I.  
6
  Id. art. II.  
7
  See, e.g., Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928 (2d Cir. 1983).  To illustrate the 
difficulty in reaching a uniform understanding of the Convention, the Bergesen court wrote:  “The family 
of nations has endlessly—some say since the Tower of Babel—sought to breach the barrier of language.”  
Id. at 929; see also discussion infra Parts IV-V.  
8
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1). 
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rise to complexity in the Convention’s coverage.  Moreover, because it is 
impossible to require universal procedural protections in different legal 
systems, each contracting state must determine the implementation 
procedures of the Convention within its jurisdiction.  In order to understand 
its application, one must put the Convention in the context of each 
contracting state’s legal system.  
Both China and the United States are members of the New York 
Convention.9  However, because of differences in court systems, sources of 
law, and legal methodology, the Convention’s application differs 
dramatically between the two countries.  
This article compares the effects of domestic court interventions on 
the scope of the New York Convention, in both China and in the United 
States.  Most significantly, if a claim is not within the scope of the 
Convention, the purported substantive benefits provided in the Convention 
become meaningless to the claiming party.  Local court interpretations are 
therefore crucial to achieving the Convention’s goals.  In general, China and 
the United States both support the New York Convention.  However, the two 
countries stand apart in legal approach and analytical methodology in 
implementing the New York Convention.  Through case law, this article 
uncovers the impact and consequences of local court intervention on the 
scope of the Convention.  This article also proposes appropriate approaches 
that local courts in China and the United States should adopt.   
Part II introduces the basic arbitration legal framework in both China 
and the United States.  Part III offers a theoretical analysis of the 
Convention’s scope of application.  Part IV closely examines leading cases 
in the United States on the scope of application issues and criticizes the 
inconsistencies of court practice.  Part V focuses on leading Chinese case 
studies regarding the Convention’s scope of application and its related 
impact on foreign businesses in China.  The Conclusion argues that 
inappropriate court intervention on the application of the Convention 
jeopardizes its goals, and offers suggestions for improvement to judiciaries 
in both China and the United States. 
                                           
9
  The Convention became effective in the United States on December 29, 1970.  21 U.S.T. 2517.  
See also DECISIONS ON CHINA’S ACCESSION TO THE CONVENTION ON RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF 
FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS, adopted by the 18th Meeting of the 6th Session of the Standing Committee 
of the NPC on December 2, 1986. 
406 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 2 
 
II. ARBITRATION LEGAL FRAMEWORK IN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES 
Both China and the United States are members of the New York 
Convention.  However, common membership does not necessarily guarantee 
a unified application of the terms of the Convention.  Domestic courts and 
implementing laws play critical roles in enforcing arbitral awards under the 
New York Convention.  As a result, different approaches in interpreting the 
Convention by different local courts may result in striking discrepancies in 
legal consequences.  An understanding of domestic legal sources and court 
systems in the United States and China is essential to conducting a 
comparative study on the application of the New York Convention in the two 
countries.  
A.  Features of the Arbitration Legal Framework in China 
Chinese law treats international arbitration cases differently from 
domestic ones.  In general, parties to international arbitration cases have 
more autonomy and greater freedom from government interference: judicial 
review of international arbitration is limited to procedural issues, while 
review of domestic arbitration looks at substantive issues.  Moreover, 
arbitration institutes in China are separated into international and domestic 
bodies.  Though the jurisdiction of domestic and international arbitration 
commissions overlap, international arbitration institutes handle most 
international arbitrations.  Furthermore, Chinese arbitral institutes offer 
different procedural rules for international arbitration and usually provide 
participating parties in international arbitration cases with broader autonomy 
than in domestic arbitration cases.  Finally, the New York Convention is 
ultimately implemented in China through a unitary court system that has less 
judicial independence.   
1. The Chinese Court System 
China has four levels of courts, corresponding to the central level and 
the three local levels of government.10  Unlike the separate court systems 
                                           
10
  XIAN FA [Constitution] art. 128 (1982) (P.R.C.).  The central people’s government in Beijing has 
ultimate power over the entire country.  It consists of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the 
Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate.  Below this, there are thirty-one 
provincial governing bodies.  Within these provincial jurisdictions, there are three major lower levels of 
governance: municipal, county and district, and township.  Each lower level is subordinate to the higher 
level with authority covering the geographical area.  The governmental structure at each level mirrors that 
of the central government, except that the township level does not have a standing committee for the 
people’s congresses.  See id. ch. 5, Local People’s Congresses and Local People’s Governments.   
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under the federalist system in the United States, however, these several 
levels of courts form a unitary system.  The Supreme People’s Court has 
highest authority.11  Beneath it, there are three levels of local courts: the high 
people’s courts at the provincial level, the intermediate people’s courts at the 
prefecture or major municipality levels, and the basic people’s courts at the 
county or municipal district levels.12  Each court is organized by and 
responsible to a people’s congress at the corresponding level.13  The 
president of each court is elected by the people’s congress at that level, and 
other judges are appointed by the standing committee of the people’s 
congress.14  Unlike the independent operation of court systems in the United 
States, a lower level court in China is subject to supervision from the higher 
level courts of proper jurisdiction.15   This supervision is in addition to 
appellate review, and a higher court may intervene in a lower court’s trial 
proceedings.  The Supreme People’s Court also has the authority and duty to 
interpret laws, administer the judiciary of all levels, and perform quasi-
legislative activities.16 
Within a Chinese court, judicial duties are usually divided into five 
branches: criminal, administrative, economic, civil, and enforcement.17  In 
order to meet special needs, several higher-level courts also have specialty 
divisions, such as an intellectual property branch.18  Furthermore, case 
assignments in a court are determined by how the disputes are classified.  
For example, commercial arbitration disputes are classified as economic 
cases and are usually handled by the economic division in a court.19  Unlike 
                                           
11
  Id. art. 127.  
12
  See Organic Law of the People’s Court of PRC, art. 18, 23, 26, adopted at the Second Session of 
the Fifth National People's Congress on July 1, 1979 and amended by the Second Meeting of the Sixth 
National People's Congress on September 2, 1983 (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG 
44).  
13
  XIAN FA art. 128.   
14
  Organic Law of the People’s Court, supra note 12, art. 35.  Some exceptions exist for intermediate 
prefectural, provincial and municipal courts directly under the central government.  Id.   
15
  XIAN FA art. 127.   
16
  RANDALL PEERENBOOM, CHINA’S LONG MARCH TOWARD RULE OF LAW 283 (2002); see also 
Organic Law of the People’s Court, supra note 12, arts. 30, 33.  
17
  Chinese national law provides that each court should have at least three functional branches, 
namely, criminal, civil and economic branches.  Intermediate or higher level courts have discretionary 
power to set up “such other divisions as are deemed necessary.”  The enforcement branch is not a division 
adjudicating cases but it was offered status equivalent to the other branches.  See Organic Law of the 
People’s Court of PRC, supra note 12, arts. 24, 27, 31. 
18
  DANIEL C.K. CHOW, THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA IN A NUTSHELL 
201 (2003).  
19
  Economic cases are those involving a sector of the economy, such as machinery, consumer 
products, and individual enterprise.  Contractual disputes are assigned to the economic division, except for 
real estate contracts.  In general, the civil division handles disputes which involve individuals, family 
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court practice in the United States, where the assigned judge or a bench of 
judges decides cases independently, each Chinese court has a committee 
which adjudicates major and complicated cases.20  This committee has final 
authority, and its members, appointed by the people’s congress at the same 
level, are selected from the senior judges of the court.21  
Any level court may be a trial court in China.  The nature and 
importance of a case are considered in determining original jurisdiction.22  
County or district level basic courts are courts of general original jurisdiction 
for civil litigation, but there are many exceptions.  For example, intermediate 
courts have original jurisdiction over significant foreign-related cases, cases 
that have “major impact” in their respective jurisdictions, and cases that are 
designated by the Supreme People’s Court from time to time.23  The 
Supreme People’s and High People’s Courts may also preside over the trial 
in cases of major impact, and a higher level court always has discretionary 
authority to remove a case from a lower court.24  The “major impact” criteria 
in civil cases are usually the monetary amount in dispute, the potential 
impact of the outcome, and the geographical coverage of the dispute.25  
Intermediate and higher courts are also courts of appeal for decisions from 
the immediate lower level courts in their jurisdiction.26  Unlike the legal 
review function of an appellate court in the United States, an appellate court 
in China also investigates and determines facts.27 
                                                                                                                              
relationships, or personal and family property (e.g., housing, labor disputes, inheritance, tort, defamation, 
and divorce).   
20
  Organic Law of People’s Court, supra note 12, art. 11; see also PEERENBOOM, supra note 16, at 
284.   
21
  The judicative committee consists of the president, the vice president, the chief judge for 
divisions, and senior judges, appointed by the standing committee of the people’s congress at the 
corresponding level.  Organic Law of People’s Court, supra note 12, art. 11.  
22 
 See Civil Procedure Law of PRC, art. 18-21, adopted on April 9, 1991 at the Fourth Session of the 
Seventh National People's Congress (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG 19) [hereinafter 
1991 Civil Procedure Law].  
23
  Id.  art. 19.  
24
  Id.  art. 21. 
25
  See CHOW, supra note 18, at 205-08 (laying out the framework for the jurisdiction of Chinese 
courts in both civil and criminal cases, and noting that all criminal cases involving foreigners are to be tried 
in the first instance by an intermediate people’s court).   
26
  1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, arts. 147-159 (ch. 14, Second Instance Procedures).  
27
  See Lingyun Gao, Comment, What Makes a Lawyer in China? The Chinese Legal Education 
System After China’s Entry into the WTO, 10 WILLAMETTE J. INT'L L. & DISPUTE RES. 197, 210 (discussing 
generally Chinese court systems and pointing out differences in appellate procedures between the United 
States and China). 
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2. Arbitration Related Legal Sources in China 
a. International Treaties  
According to Chinese rules on conflict of laws, international 
conventions (or treaties) of which China is a member or a signatory apply in 
Chinese courts directly.  In cases of conflict between international 
conventions and Chinese domestic laws, international conventions or treaties 
prevail.28  Thus, arbitration related conventions of which China is a member, 
such as the New York Convention, apply to cases in Chinese courts directly 
and prevail over any conflicting domestic laws.   
b. 1994 Arbitration Law  
The adoption of the 1994 Arbitration Law29 was a significant 
milestone in Chinese legislative history.  Though the main focus of the law 
was to reorganize the domestic arbitration system, it impacted international 
commercial arbitration in China as well.30  The seventh of its eight chapters 
contains special provisions for foreign-related arbitration.31  The other 
chapters also apply to foreign-related arbitration as long as they do not 
conflict with these special provisions.32  The law does not, however, cover 
foreign arbitration that is not administrated in Chinese territory.  
                                           
28
  If any international treaty concluded or acceded to by China “contains provisions differing from 
those in the laws of the People's Republic of China, the provisions of the international treaty shall apply, 
unless the provisions are ones on which the People's Republic of China has announced reservations.”  
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE CIVIL LAW OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA art. 142, adopted at the 
Fourth Session of the Sixth National People's Congress, promulgated by Presidential Order No. 37, Apr. 
12, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987, (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG 1165); see also 
Sheng Chang Wang, The Impact of New Contract on Arbitration, ARB. & L. NEWSL, June 1999, at 5 (in 
Chinese). 
29
  Arbitration Law of PRC, adopted by ninth session of the Standing Committee of eighth NPC on 
Aug. 31, 1994, effective on Sept. 1, 1995 (available in LEXIS’ Chinalawinfo library, PRCLEG 710) 
[hereinafter 1994 Arbitration Law]. 
30
  Before the 1994 Arbitration Law became effective, domestic arbitration bodies were mainly 
administrative organs of the Chinese government, with commissions set up to govern different types of 
disputes (such as the economic contract arbitration commission, labor dispute arbitration commission, and 
the technology contact arbitration commission).  By adopting the 1994 Arbitration Law, the Chinese 
domestic system was unified, and relatively independent arbitration commissions were set up in more than 
140 municipalities around the country.  Newly established arbitration commissions have broad jurisdiction 
over contractual or property disputes, except for labor and farming contract disputes.  Katherine L. Lynch, 
Chinese Law: The New Arbitration Law, 26 HONG KONG L.J. 104, 105.   
31
  1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, ch. 7, arts. 65-73.  
32
  Id. art. 65 (“Matters not covered by this chapter shall be handled according to other relevant 
provisions of this law”). 
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c. 1991 Civil Procedure Law 
Enacted in 1991, the Civil Procedure Law of the PRC is another 
significant piece of arbitration-related legislation.33  It separates arbitral 
awards into domestic, foreign-related, and foreign awards,34 with each 
receiving a different standard of judicial review.  For domestic awards, 
courts may conduct a substantive review of evidentiary issues, application of 
law, and corruption of arbitrators.35  However, foreign-related awards 
entered by a Chinese arbitration tribunal invite only procedural review of 
such matters as whether the arbitration process followed the procedural rules 
and whether parties were given proper notice for hearings.36  The law also 
requires that Chinese courts recognize and enforce foreign arbitral awards in 
accordance with the New York Convention.37  When an award is entered in a 
foreign country that is not a member of the Convention, Chinese courts will 
recognize and enforce the award according to the principle of reciprocity.38  
The provisions setting the standards for judicial review of arbitration awards 
are incorporated into the 1994 Arbitration Law by direct reference.39  It is 
significant that a court’s ruling on a denial of a request for enforcing an 
arbitral award is not eligible for appeal, while a ruling on the validity of an 
arbitration agreement may be appealed.40 
d. State Council Administrative Regulations and Interpretations  
The State Council, as the top level of the executive branch, has 
constitutional authority to both enact administrative regulations and 
implement laws.41  In addition, ministries and commissions under the State 
Council have issued numerous implementation guidelines and administrative 
interpretations of laws.42 
                                           
33
  1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22. 
34
  Id. arts. 217, 260, 269.  
35
  Id. art. 217.  
36
  Id. art. 260.  
37
  Id. art. 269.  
38
  Id. 
39
  1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, art. 63 (referring to article 217 of the 1991 Civil Procedure 
Law as ground for denying enforcement of domestic arbitration awards); see also 1994 Arbitration Law, 
supra note 29, art. 71(referring to article 260(1) of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law as ground for denying 
recognition or enforcement of arbitral awards).  
40
  1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, arts. 140(1)(b)(i), 140(2). 
41
  XIAN FA arts. 85, 89, 90.  
42
  The Chinese system of legal interpretation is unique.  The Standing Committee of the NPC has 
legislative interpretative power; the State Council has administrative interpretative power; and, the SPC has 
judicial interpretative power.  CHOW, supra note 18, at 168-71. 
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By adopting administrative orders and interpretations, the State 
Council has played a key role in the interpretation of the 1994 Arbitration 
Law.  During the transitional period when the domestic arbitration system 
was being reorganized under the 1994 Law, the State Council issued several 
administrative guidelines of significant impact.  They covered the 
organizational structure of arbitration commissions, administrative 
registration of the commissions, sample arbitration procedural rules, fee-
charging schedules, and gave detailed rules for a smooth transition of 
operations of the old system into the new system.43 
Additionally, the State Council aggressively intervened in a 
jurisdictional dispute between the local arbitration commissions and the 
foreign-related arbitration commissions.44  Prior to the adoption of the 1994 
Arbitration Law, foreign-related arbitration institutes, namely China 
International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and 
China Maritime Arbitration Commission (CMAC), enjoyed exclusive 
jurisdiction over foreign-related cases.45  The 1994 law ambiguously 
provides that “foreign-related arbitration commissions may be established by 
the China International Chamber of Commerce.”46  The newly established 
local arbitration commissions took the position that the law was not intended 
to confer exclusive jurisdiction over foreign-related cases to foreign-related 
arbitration commissions, but rather that jurisdiction was meant to be 
concurrent.47  When the debate heated up, the State Council, through its sub-
agency, issued a notice that gave local arbitration commissions the 
concurrent jurisdiction they desired.48  Many criticized the State Council for 
                                           
43
  See, e.g., Notice of Bureau of Administrative Affair of the State Council on Preparation Work for 
Re-establishing Arbitration Institution and Establishing Chinese Arbitration Association, issued on Nov. 
13, 1994 (designating seven municipalities as trial cities for establishing arbitration commissions under the 
new law and providing guidelines for several organs under the State Council to work on regulations for 
establishing arbitration institutions) (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal); see also Notice of 
Bureau of Administrative Affair of the State Council on Further Efforts on Re-Establishing Arbitration 
Institutes, issued May 26, 1995 (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal); see also Notice of Bureau 
of Administrative Affair of the State Council on Publishing Plan for Re-Establishing Arbitration Institutes, 
Registration Method for Arbitration Commissions, and Method on Fee Charging Standards for Arbitration 
Institutes, issued July 28, 1995 (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
44
  China International Economic and Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC) and China Maritime 
Arbitration Commission (CMAC) have been China’s primary international arbitration institutes since the 
1950’s.   
45
  See infra, note 275 and accompanying text.    
46
  1994 Arbitration Law art. 66 (emphasis added). 
47
  Challengers argued that the law would have used “shall” instead of “may” if it intended to reserve 
jurisdiction on foreign-related cases exclusively to foreign arbitration commission.  ZHIDONG CHEN, 
《 国 国国国国国际 》 [INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION] (in Chinese) 61 (Law Press, 1998). 
48
  See BUREAU OF ADMINISTRATIVE AFFAIRS, STATE COUNCIL, NOTICE ON SEVERAL PROBLEMS TO 
BE CLARIFIED CONCERNING THE THOROUGH IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PRC ARBITRATION LAW (June 8, 
1996) (“[T]he main duties of the re-organized arbitration commissions shall be to accept domestic 
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going beyond its authority and expanding local commissions’ jurisdiction in 
conflict with the 1994 Arbitration Law.49   
e. Judicial Interpretation by the Supreme People’s Court and 
Leading Cases of Higher Courts 
Through the Organic Law of the People’s Courts, the National 
People’s Congress delegated to the Supreme People’s Court the authority to 
interpret laws and issue practical rules.50  A narrow view of judicial 
interpretation in China is that it is limited to explanations, provisions, and 
replies of the Supreme People's Court, that are adopted through a quasi-
lawmaking procedure.51  A judicial interpretation will not be effective until 
approved by the judicial committee of the Court and published in the 
People’s Court Daily (renmin fayuan bao).52  Once adopted, a judicial 
interpretation is a binding legal source to which all courts may cite as a legal 
basis in their decisions or rulings.53  However, the Court’s judicial 
interpretations cannot conflict with the laws of the National People’s 
Congress or State Council regulations, nor are they binding upon either of 
these two bodies.54 
A broader concept of judicial interpretation is that it not only includes 
decisions of the Supreme People’s Court (“SPC”), but also some decisions 
of the high people’s courts (“HPC”) and the intermediate people’s courts 
(“IPC”).  In theory, unlike the American common law system, Chinese 
courts do not adopt the doctrine of stare decisis and precedents therefore do 
not have binding authority in lower courts.55  In practice, however, the SPC 
                                                                                                                              
arbitration cases.  Where the parties to a foreign-related arbitration case voluntarily select arbitration by a 
reorganized arbitration commission, such commission may accept the case.”). 
49
  See, e.g., CHEN, supra note 47, at 61-64 (criticizing both the State Council’s inappropriate 
expansion and the NPC drafter’s looseness with legislative language).  
50
  Organic Law of the People’s Courts, supra note 12, art. 33.  According to the Chinese 
Constitution, the Standing Committee of the NPC is the appropriate organ to interpret the Constitution and 
laws.  XIAN FA art. 67(1), (4).  
51
  SUPREME PEOPLE'S COURT [SPC], VARIOUS PROVISIONS CONCERNING JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION 
(June 23, 1997) (Chinese version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal).     
52
  Id. arts. 3, 8, 11.  
53
  Id. art. 4.  
54
  See Li fa fa [Legislation Law] art. 88(1)(a), (b) (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l 
People’s Cong., Mar. 15 2000, effective July 1, 2000) 2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. 
GAZ. 112 (P.R.C.).  Chinese courts do not have the power of judicial review to overrule statutes or 
regulations enacted by the NPC or the State Council.  According to the Legislation Law, the Standing 
Committee of the NPC is the appropriate body to review whether an administrative regulation conflicts 
with the Constitution or national law.  The State Council has the right to review administrative orders or 
regulations entered by its sub-agencies. 
55
  See generally CHOW, supra note 18, at 169 (comparing U.S. and Chinese legal precedent and 
interpretations).  
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selects leading cases from its own decisions and decisions of lower courts, 
and publishes them in its SPC Gazette and on its official website.56  Legal 
principles and rules endorsed by the SPC through these published cases have 
significant influence over courts nationwide.  Lower courts are most likely 
to follow these rules and principles since the failure to observe de facto 
precedent may result in a future reversal from the higher courts.  In fact, 
many SPC formal judicial interpretations are largely restatements and 
summaries of the rules and principles embodied in previously published 
leading cases.57   
The Supreme People’s Court has issued more than a dozen judicial 
interpretations concerning international arbitration that offer either 
clarifications to ambiguous legislative provisions or new rules for legal 
issues not addressed by laws and regulations.58  The SPC’s legal 
interpretations are also major sources of practice guidelines for the New 
York Convention.59   
Complementing the SPC, the HPCs and IPCs frequently present “legal 
opinions” on issues that the SPC has not interpreted.  Although these “legal 
opinions” are not binding legal sources, lower courts in the jurisdiction of 
the HPC or IPC usually follow them.60  In several instances, HPC’s and 
IPC’s local implementation of “legal opinions” have offered valuable and 
practical experience to the SPC, and some local “legal opinions” have been 
ratified by the SPC in later judicial interpretations.61  Most recently, adopting 
local HPC and IPC “legal opinions” on international arbitration, the SPC 
published a proposed version of the Provisions on Handling Foreign-Related 
Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated Abroad by People’s Courts (2003 
SPC Provisions (draft)).62  The Provisions collectively incorporate the “legal 
                                           
56
  Supreme People’s Court website, http://www.court.gov.cn (last visited April 23, 2006).  
57
  Yuwu Liu, Arbitration Agreement: The Chinese Practice and Future Trends, 16-8 MEALEY’S 
INTL. ARB. REP. 16 (2001). 
58
  See JOHN MO, ARBITRATION LAW IN CHINA, app. 7, nos. 1-34 (2001) (containing “Selected Major 
Judicial Interpretations of the NSC Concerning Arbitration” in English). 
59
  SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, NOTICE CONCERNING THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CONVENTION ON 
THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS (Apr. 10, 1997), reprinted in MO, 
supra note 58, app. 7; SUPREME PEOPLE’S COURT, NOTICE CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF FOREIGN 
RELATED ARBITRATION AND FOREIGN ARBITRATIONS (Aug. 28, 1995), reprinted in MO, supra note 58, 
app. 7. 
60
  Lower courts will follow the legal opinions of the higher courts in the same jurisdiction.  In 
addition, higher courts have influence on the promotion of judges in lower courts.   
61
  For example, the Shanghai HPC, the Beijing HPC, and the Shenzhen IPC issued their respective 
legal opinions on implementing arbitration-related issues, including such topics as the validity of arbitration 
agreements, jurisdiction and venue of courts, interim measures and re-arbitration, and enforcement.   
62
  See Draft for Public Comment Version of SPC Provisions on Handling by People’s Court of 
Foreign-Related Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated Abroad (《 最最最最国最 最最最国最 最 最国国涉关 关  
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opinions” of the Shanghai HPC and the Beijing HPC, and is intended for 
nationwide application upon finalization of the public comments and 
review.63 
f. Other Laws and Regulations  
Provisions related to arbitration are also seen in other legislation.  For 
example, the Contract Law of the PRC has several articles incidentally 
stipulating arbitration related issues.64   
B. The United States Legal Arbitration System  
The law in the United States does not clearly differentiate between 
international and domestic arbitration.  Arbitration disputes involving 
foreign elements may be heard in both state and federal courts.  In addition, 
arbitration is regulated at both federal and state levels,65 and both federal and 
state laws may be applicable to international arbitration cases.  On the 
application of the New York Convention, the Federal Arbitration Act 
(“FAA”) contains a special implementation chapter with a broader scope 
than that of the Convention.66  Moreover, FAA provisions govern the areas 
not covered by the special implementation chapter.  Furthermore, neither the 
FAA nor the Convention excludes the application of state laws.  As a result, 
application of the New York Convention involves puzzling conflicts in 
choice of law rules.   
1. Applicable Law: Federal Law v. State Law 
Until the U.S. Congress enacted the FAA in 1925,67 state laws were 
applicable to all arbitration cases in both federal and state courts.68  As 
decided in Erie R. Co. v Tompkins, federal courts must apply both statutes 
and common laws of the state in diversity cases, except in matters governed 
                                                                                                                              
及最国国国及及及及及 及规 征征征 征见 》( ) ) (published in PEOPLE’S COURT DAILY, Dec. 31, 2003, at 1, 3) (on file 
with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
63
  Id. at 1.  The public comment period ended on February 20, 2004.  
64
  Contract Law, art. 54, 128, 129, adopted by the Ninth NPC on Mar. 15, 1999 (P.R.C.). 
65
  See Sebastien Besson, The Utility of State Laws Regulating International Commercial Arbitration 
and Their Compatibility with the FAA, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 211, 212 (2000) (noting that “like virtually 
all fields of law in the United States,” arbitration is regulated at federal and state levels). 
66
  9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208.  
67
  Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), ch. 213, §§ 1-5, 43 Stat. 883-86 (1925) (current version at 9 
U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (2004)). 
68
  Besson, supra note 65, at 212. 
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by the United States Constitution or by federal statutes.69  Therefore, state 
laws and federal statutes may concurrently apply to arbitration cases. 
The FAA created federal substantive and procedural laws to be 
enforced both in federal and state courts.70  The FAA was enacted under 
authority of the Interstate Commerce Clause;71 federal courts, therefore, are 
not bound to follow state law or state public policies in determining 
arbitration cases arising from the FAA.72  Fully respecting the rule set forth 
in Erie, the United States Supreme Court, in Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & 
Conklin Mfg. Co. and Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, held that the 
FAA applies in diversity cases in federal courts “because Congress had so 
intended.”73  In addition, Congress intended for the FAA to preempt state 
law in certain areas.  In those areas neither federal nor state courts may apply 
state statutes in conflict with the FAA.74 
However, preemption by the FAA is limited, and the scope of its 
application has been controversial since the enactment of the FAA.  Under 
the supremacy clause of the Constitution, federal law supersedes conflicting 
state laws.75  Usually, the criteria used to decide preemption are the intent of 
Congress,76 and the general constitutional issue of whether state law 
                                           
69
  The U.S. Constitution recognizes and preserves the autonomy and independence of the states in 
their legislative and judicial departments, and the federal courts should enforce controlling laws regardless 
of their format in statute or in common law.  Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198 
(1956); see also Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).  The Tenth Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution states “the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it 
to the States, are reserved to the States, respectively, or to the people.”  U.S. CONST. amend. X.  
70
  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (stating in dicta 
that the FAA governs in “either state or federal court”); see also Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 
(1984) (reaffirming that the FAA creates substantive federal law governing both federal and state courts); 
Romnes v. Bache & Co., 439 F. Supp. 833 (W.D. Wis. 1977).   
71
  Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 14-15 (defining the FAA’s reach expansively and as coinciding with 
that of the Commerce Clause (U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3)); see also Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. 
Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 271 (1995) (giving detailed reasons why the FAA’s scope can be said to have 
expanded along with Congress’ commerce power over the years).  
72
  See Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 838 (distinguishing the application of Erie); see also Robert 
Lawrence Co. v Devonshire Fabrics, Inc. 271 F.2d 402 (2d Cir. 1959). 
73
  See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 405 (1967) (characterizing the 
FAA as federal substantive law enacted pursuant to Congress’ powers over interstate commerce and 
admiralty and noting that “Congress may prescribe how federal courts are to conduct themselves with 
respect to subject matter over which Congress plainly has power to legislate”); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 
U.S. at 271. 
74
  See Southland Corp., 465 U.S. at 16 (holding that the FAA pre-empts state law and that state 
courts cannot apply state statutes to invalidate arbitration agreements); see also Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. 265. 
75
  Besson, supra note 65, at 220. 
76
  See Securities Indus. Ass’ns v. Connolly, 703 F. Supp. 146, 150 (D. Mass. 1988) (“In confronting 
a preemption claim, the 'sole task' of the court is to determine the intent of Congress.”) (quoting Mass. 
Medical Soc'y v. Dukakis, 815 F.2d 790, 791 (1st Cir. 1987)). 
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undermines the goals and polices of the federal arbitration law.77  However, 
the FAA neither contains any express preemptive provision nor clearly 
reflects a congressional intent to cover all issues of arbitration.78  In addition, 
the general constitutional principle requires the application of state law 
unless it “undermine[s] the goals and policies” of the federal arbitration 
law.79 
In general, the scope of preemption may be divided into three major 
categories: (1) the validity of the arbitration agreement; (2) the arbitrability 
of the dispute; and (3) other aspects of the arbitral process.80  In the first 
category, the Supreme Court held that federal law governing the validity of 
arbitration agreements is binding on state courts.81  However, state law is not 
preempted in this category.  For example, the “saving clause” of § 2 of the 
FAA provides that an arbitration clause may be invalidated “upon such 
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.”82  
Since each state has the power to regulate contracts, including arbitration 
agreements, state law will apply to determine the validity of the arbitration 
agreement (or clause) on the same grounds that state law applies to other 
contracts.83  Meanwhile, in applying state contract law to arbitration 
agreements, a state court cannot treat arbitration agreements less favorably 
than any other contract.84  The FAA makes a state policy unlawful if it places 
arbitration clauses on unequal footing with other contracts.  Such a policy 
would be in direct contrast with the intent of Congress as expressed in the 
language of the FAA.85  In addition, parties are free to choose the applicable 
law for their arbitration because the FAA intends to enforce arbitration 
agreements according to their own terms.86  It is clear that the FAA preempts 
                                           
77
  Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 478 (1989); see 
also Besson, supra note 65, at 220 (discussing the criteria).   
78
  See Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co., 350 U.S. 198 (1956) (upholding application of state arbitration 
law to arbitration provision in contract not covered by the FAA). 
79
  Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. 468.  
80
  Besson, supra note 65, at 221.  
81
  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983); Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). 
82
  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 281 (1995). 
83
  Besson, supra note 65, at 221. 
84
  Allied-Bruce, 513 U.S. at 281; see also Besson, supra note 65, at 221.  But see First Options of 
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995) (ambiguously stating, “Courts generally should apply 
ordinary state-law principles governing contract formation in deciding whether” an agreement exists.).      
85
  See Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trs. of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 468, 475 (1989) 
(citing authority that due regard must be given to the federal policy favoring arbitration when applying 
general state law contract principles to interpretation of arbitration agreements). 
86
  See 9 U.S.C. § 3 (2004) (providing that arbitration be “in accordance with the terms of the 
agreement”); see also Volt Info. Scis., Inc., 489 U.S. at 479 (holding that enforcement of state rules of 
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state laws dictating the format of arbitration agreements because the writing 
requirement provision in the FAA has exclusive application in both state and 
federal courts.87 
In the second category of arbitrability, § 2 of the FAA is of greatest 
relevance,88 providing that any maritime transaction or contract involving 
commerce is to be arbitrable.89  This amounts to “a congressional declaration 
of a liberal federal policy favoring arbitration agreements, notwithstanding 
any state substantive or procedural policies to the contrary.”90  The Supreme 
Court in Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital stated that the issue of 
arbitrability must be addressed with a “healthy regard for the federal policy 
favoring arbitration.”91  Supported by decisions from courts of appeal, the 
Supreme Court further concluded that the FAA had established the rule that 
any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in 
favor of arbitration.92  
Finally, as to the remaining aspects of the arbitral process, there are no 
settled rules on whether federal law preempts state law.93  The state courts’ 
approach to the application of the FAA has been significantly different than 
the approach taken by the federal courts.94  The Supreme Court has yet to 
offer any guidance on applicable law issues, and the state courts are left with 
wide discretion as long their decisions do not conflict with the FAA and 
federal case law.  Interestingly, a substantial number of state courts have 
held that they are bound to apply the FAA.95  However, some state courts 
                                                                                                                              
arbitration chosen by parties in their agreements is fully consistent with the goals of the FAA, even if the 
results differ completely from those obtained from application of the FAA).  
87
  See Besson, supra note 65, at 225 (citing Erickson v. Aetna Health Plans of Cal., Inc., 71 Cal. 
App. 4th 646 (1999) (holding that 9 U.S.C. § 2 preempts California state law on formal arbitration 
agreements)). 
88
  See Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983) (holding that 9 
U.S.C. § 2 governs arbitrability in both state and federal courts). 
89
  9 U.S.C. § 2 (2004) provides:  
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising 
out of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part thereof, 
or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy arising out of 
such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save 
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract. 
90
  Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hospital, 460 U.S. at 24. 
91
  Id.  
92
  See id. at 25 (holding that such policy should apply “whether the problem at hand is the 
construction of the contract language itself or an allegation of waiver, delay, or a like defense to 
arbitrability”). 
93
  Besson, supra note 65, at 221.  
94
  See id. at 222-23 (detailing examples of state courts’ different approaches).  
95
 See Linda R. Hirshman, The Second Arbitration Trilogy: The Federalization of Arbitration Law, 
71 VA. L. REV. 1305, 1325-7 (1985) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984); McEntire v. 
Monarch Feed Mills, 631 S.W.2d 307 (Ark. 1982); Keating v. Super. Ct., 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), 
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decline to apply the FAA, claiming that it created substantive law only 
applicable in federal court.96 
In a positive approach to unifying state and federal practice, over 
twenty-five states have, since 1955, adopted the Uniform Arbitration Act 
(“UAA”), the content of which largely parallels that of the FAA.97  In 
responding to the increased importance of international commercial 
arbitration, five states have enacted new laws on international arbitration by 
adopting, with modifications, the UNCITRAL Model Law on International 
Commercial Arbitration.98  Meanwhile, several states introduced new laws 
favoring international arbitration, although they differ in approach from the 
UNCITRAL Model Law.99 
In summary, both federal and state law may apply to arbitration cases 
in state and federal courts.  As a general principal, state arbitration laws 
apply to arbitration disputes except on issues that the Supreme Court has 
clearly declared to be preempted by the FAA.   
                                                                                                                              
appeal dismissed in part and rev’d in part sub nom; Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith Inc. v. Melamed, 
405 So. 2d 790 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981); West Point-Pepperell v. Multi-Line Indus., 201 S.E.2d 452 (Ga. 
1973); Hecla Mining Co. v. Bunker Hill Co., 617 P.2d 861 (Idaho 1980); Pathman Constr. Co. v. Knox 
County Hosp. Ass'n, 326 N.E.2d 844 (Ind. App. Ct. 1975); R.J. Palmer Constr. Co. v. Wichita Band 
Instrument Co., 642 P.2d 127 (Kan. App. 1982); Fite & Warmath Constr. Co. v MYS Corp., 559 S.W.2d 
729 (Ky. 1977); State ex rel. St. Joseph Light & Power Co. v. Donelson, 631 S.W.2d 887 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1982); Burke County Pub. School Bd. of Educ. v. Shaver P’ship, 279 S.E.2d 816 (N.C.1981); Episcopal 
Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 239 S.E.2d 647 (S.C. 1977); Tenn. River Pulp & Paper Co. v. Eichleay Corp., 
637 S.W.2d 853 (Tenn. 1982); Miller v. Puritan Fashions Corp., 516 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); 
Allison v. Medicab Int'l, 597 P.2d 380 (Wash.1979)). 
96
  Most state courts so ruled after Robert Lawrence Co. v. Devonshire Fabrics, Inc., 271 F.2d 402 
(2d Cir. 1959).  In Robert Lawrence, the court held that the body of law created under the U.S. Arbitration 
Act is substantive in character, not procedural, and it encompasses questions of interpretation and 
construction as well as questions of validity, revocability and enforceability.  Such questions are to be 
adjudicated by the federal courts whenever they have subject matter jurisdiction, including diversity 
jurisdiction.  Pullman, Inc. v. Phoenix Steel Corp., 304 A.2d 334 (Del. Super. Ct. 1973); Kress Corp. v. 
Edward C. Levy Co., 430 N.E.2d 593 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981); Thayer v. Am. Fin. Advisors, 322 N.W.2d 599 
(Minn. 1982); Withers Busby Group v. Surety Indus., 538 S.W.2d 198 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976)).  
97
  Besson, supra note 65, at 212.   
98
  Besson so concluded in his 2000 article.  Id. at 217.  California, Connecticut, Illinois, Oregon, and 
Texas have adopted the UNCITRAL Model Law in some form.  U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade 
Law, Status: 1985-UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, http://www.uncitral. 
org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1985Model_arbitration_status.html (last visited Apr. 23, 2006).  In 
1988 California enacted legislation entitled Arbitration and Conciliation of International Commercial 
Disputes.  CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 1297.11-.432.  In 1989, Connecticut enacted the UNCITRAL Model 
Law on International Commercial Arbitration.  CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 50a-100 to -136.  Also in 1989, 
Texas enacted the Arbitration and Conciliation of International Disputes Act.  TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. 
CODE. ANN. §§ 172.001 - 172.175.  In 1991, North Carolina enacted the International Commercial 
Arbitration Act.  N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-567.30 to 1-567.68.  Also in 1997, Ohio enacted the International 
Commercial Arbitration Act, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2712.01-.91, and Oregon enacted the International 
Commercial Arbitration and Conciliation Act, OR. REV. STAT. §§ 36.450-.558.   
99
  See Besson supra note 65, at 217 (noting that Florida, Hawaii, Georgia, Maryland, and Colorado 
enacted laws regulating international arbitration, all of which strongly favor international arbitration).  
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2. The Federal Arbitration Act  
The Federal Arbitration Act contains three chapters: Chapter 1, 
enacted in 1925, commonly referred to as the Domestic FAA, establishes the 
rules for recognizing and enforcing arbitration agreements and awards in 
both domestic and international contexts;100 Chapter 2, enacted in 1970 and 
commonly referred to as the Convention Act of the implementing legislation, 
incorporates and implements the New York Convention;101 and, Chapter 3, 
enacted in 1990, incorporates and implements the Inter-American 
Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (“Panama Convention 
Act”).102  
The Domestic FAA offers comprehensive enforcement procedures for 
arbitration agreements and awards, and it applies to all arbitration cases.103  
In fact, both the Convention Act and the Panama Convention Act clearly 
provide that the Domestic FAA (Chapter 1 of FAA) applies to actions and 
proceedings brought under the Convention Acts to the extent that “Chapter 1 
is not in conflict with” the Convention Acts or the Conventions 
themselves.104 
The Convention Act, codified as Chapter 2 of FAA, was adopted to 
implement the New York Convention.  Although an original participating 
member in the United Nations Conference that produced the 1958 New York 
Convention, the United States did not accede to the New York Convention 
until 1970.105  The U.S. delegation to the 1958 New York Convention 
Conference recommended that the United States not accede because of the 
conflict between the implementation of the Convention and the state anti-
arbitration laws, as well as the United States’ lack of a sufficient domestic 
legal basis for accepting the Convention.106  The delegation suggested that 
                                           
100
  9 U.S.C. § 1 et seq.; see also Besson, supra note 65, at 19-20 (noting the use of the short titles, 
Domestic FAA and Convention Act, for Chapters One and Two, respectively). 
101
  9 U.S.C. § 201 (2004). 
102
  See generally Susan L. Karamanian, The Road to the Tribunal and Beyond: International 
Commercial Arbitration and United States Courts, 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 17, 25-43 (2002) 
(discussing the relationship between the three chapters of the FAA and their short names); see also 9 
U.S.C. § 301 (2004).  The Inter-American Convention on International Commercial Arbitration (Panama 
Convention) was concluded on January 30, 1975.  1438 U.N.T.S. 245, O.A.S.T.S. 42 (entered into force 
June 16, 1976).  “The Panama Convention incorporates the FAA’s terms unless they are in conflict with the 
Inter-American Convention's terms."  Productos Mercantiles e Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge U.S.A., Inc., 23 
F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1994) (citing 9 U.S.C. § 307 (Supp. IV 1992)).  Further elaboration on the scope of the 
Panama Convention is beyond the scope of this article.   
103
  Productos Mercantiles, 23 F.3d at 45.   
104
  9 U.S.C. §§ 208, 307. 
105
  New York Convention, supra note 3. 
106
  See Leonard V. Quigley, Accession by the United States to the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 70 YALE L.J. 1049, 1074-75 (citing Office 
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the Convention would override state anti-arbitration laws and would require 
changes in state, and possibly federal, court procedural rules.107  With the 
dramatic change of domestic attitudes toward the New York Convention in 
the following decade,108 the Senate granted accession to the Convention in 
1970, conditioned on the enactment of proper implementing legislation—
Chapter 2 of the FAA (the Convention Act).109  The Convention then became 
effective in the United States on December 29, 1970.110   
One of the major purposes of the United States' accession to the 
convention was to “encourage the recognition and enforcement of 
international arbitral awards” and to relieve the courts of heavy caseloads.111  
In addition, it also offered parties an alternative method for resolving 
disputes that was “speedier and less costly than litigation.”112  Furthermore, 
the enforcement of the Convention through the FAA has provided American 
businesses with “a widely used system to obtain domestic enforcement of 
international commercial arbitration awards, subject only to minimal 
standards of domestic judicial review.”113  
Structurally, the New York Convention was incorporated into federal 
law by the Convention Act which governs the enforcement of arbitration 
agreements and arbitral awards in federal and state courts.114  The 
Convention was published as a note following § 201 of the Convention 
Act.115 
                                                                                                                              
Report of the United States Delegation to the United Nations Conference on Commercial Arbitration 2, 15 
(1958)).  
107
  S. Exec. Rep. No. 90-10, at 1, 4.  
108
  See Besson, supra note 65, at 230-31 (noting that as U.S. courts became familiar with the 
arbitration, American lawyers and the business community started to rally around the Convention in the 
decade since its inception).  The U.S. signals its efforts to unify private law activities by participating in 
multinational negotiations.  Id.   
109
  Congress caused the delay in United States' membership in the New York Convention by its 
actions in enacting the implementing legislation.  The Senate created the new chapter based on the 
recommendations of the Secretary of State’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law.  The new 
chapter would eliminate confusion by allowing for a distinction between cases under the Domestic FAA 
and those under the Convention.  See Besson, supra note 65, at 31, n. 89  (citing S. REP. NO. 91-702, at 8-9; 
John P. McMahon, Implementation of the United Nations Convention on Foreign Arbitral Awards in the 
United States, 2 J. MAR. L. & COM. 735, 737 (1970 - 1971). 
110
  9 U.S.C. § 201.  
111
  Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983); Ultracashmere House, Ltd. v. 
Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981). 
112
  Id.  
113
  G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World 
Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 888 (1995). 
114
  Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 269-73 (1995); Indus. Risk Insurers v. 
M.A.N. Gutehoffnungshutte GmbH, 141 F.3d 1434, 1490 (11th Cir. 1998).     
115
  See 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208 (codifying the eight articles of the Convention Act). 
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As a result, the New York Convention does not apply directly in 
federal or state courts in the United States.  As provided in § 201 of the 
Convention Act, the New York Convention is implemented through the 
mechanism set out in the Convention Act.116  Article I of the New York 
Convention stipulates that it applies to arbitral awards “made in the territory 
of a State other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such 
awards are sought” and to awards “not considered as domestic awards in the 
State where their recognition and enforcement are sought.”117  Section 202 
of the Convention Act however, offers a different scope of application.  The 
Act provides that the Convention applies generally to any arbitration 
agreement or award arising out of a commercial legal relationship 
(excluding those that are entirely between U.S. citizens and do not involve 
property abroad), seeking performance, enforcement, or having some other 
reasonable relation with one or more foreign states.118  It appears that the 
scope of the Convention awards defined in the U.S. legislation is broader 
than that provided in Article I of the Convention.  The plain reading of § 202 
of the Convention Act indicates that any foreign connection may bring an 
award under the Convention.119  U.S. legislation, therefore, abandoned the 
territory criteria set forth in the Convention and expanded the scope to 
include many domestic awards.120 
III. THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF THE SCOPE OF APPLICATION OF THE NEW 
YORK CONVENTION   
As a compromise between negotiating parties to the New York 
Convention, the Convention applies both to awards entered in foreign 
territories and to awards to contracting states that are not considered 
domestic (non-domestic awards).121  The Convention does not further define 
non-domestic awards and leaves each contracting state to interpret the 
criteria.  In addition, the Convention allows each contracting state to make a 
reciprocity reservation and to apply the Convention to awards entered in 
another contracting state.122  A review of the Convention negotiation history 
reveals that the reciprocity reservation was not intended to exclude those 
awards entered in the territory in which enforcement was sought.  Differing 
                                           
116
  See 9 U.S.C. § 201 (providing that the New York Convention “shall be enforced in United States 
courts in accordance with [Chapter 2 of the Convention Act]”).  
117
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).  
118
  9 U.S.C. §§ 2, 202. 
119
  9 U.S.C § 202.  
120
  Id.  
121
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).   
122
  Id. art. I(3). 
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interpretations of the reciprocity reservation in the courts, however, has 
resulted in variable application of the Convention.123 
A. Foreign Awards vs. Non-Domestic Awards  
Article I of the New York Convention provides that the Convention 
applies to two types of arbitral awards in recognition and enforcement 
proceedings: (1) those awards made in a state other than the one where the 
recognition and enforcement of such awards are sought, or so-called 
“foreign awards”; and (2) those awards that are not considered domestic in 
the state where their recognition and enforcement are sought, or so-called 
“non-domestic awards.”124  The first category is easily understood as it is 
defined by a clear criterion: the location of the arbitral award.  The second, 
more controversial category refers to awards entered locally but for some 
reason considered “international” by the contracting state. 
The two types of arbitral awards in Article I were the product of 
unforeseen compromises between civil law and common law countries.  
However, they failed to achieve any of the originally intended goals.  The 
initial draft of the 1958 Convention stated that the Convention applied only 
to the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards made in a state other than the 
one wherein recognition and enforcement were sought.125  Therefore, the 
draft included only “foreign arbitral awards” as determined by territorial 
criterion.   
Civil law countries such as France, Italy, and West Germany strongly 
objected to this scope of application.126  They maintained that nationality of 
parties, subject of dispute, and rules of arbitral procedure were all factors 
that should be taken into account when determining whether an award has a 
substantial foreign connection.127  Technically, an arbitral award entered in a 
foreign territory may or may not be a foreign award in civil law countries.  
For example, applying French procedural law to an award entered in 
Germany may render such an award domestic to France.  Conversely, an 
arbitration award entered locally may, under certain circumstances, be 
considered foreign.  For example, applying German procedural law to an 
                                           
123
  See infra note 147 and related text.  
124
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).   
125
  Albert Jan van den Berg, When Is an Arbitral Award Nondomestic Under the New York 
Convention of 1958?, 6 PACE L. REV., 25, 33 (1985); see also U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], 
Committee on the Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, Report of the Committee on the 
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, U.N. Docs. E/2704 and E/AC.42/4/Rev.1, (Mar. 28, 1955).  
126
  G. HAIGHT, CONVENTION ON THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL 
AWARDS 1 (1958); see also Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 931 (2d Cir.1983). 
127
  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 33-34. 
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award entered in France may render such an award foreign to French courts.  
Major civil law countries strongly objected to the single territory criterion in 
the Convention draft.  Consequently, eight European civil law countries 
proposed an alternative provision stating that “the Convention applies to the 
recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards other than those considered 
domestic in the country in which they are relied upon.”128  This was intended 
to remove territory as a criterion in the determination of whether an award is 
a foreign award.129  The real value of the proposed non-domestic criterion 
was that civil law countries could avoid applying the Convention to some 
foreign rendered awards because their national laws consider them domestic.  
This can occur in situations such as when the procedural law governing the 
arbitration is the domestic law of the enforcing country.130  
Delegates from the United States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and 
Guatemala, however, argued that such an amendment would create an 
obstacle for common law countries that rely on the location of arbitration to 
determine a foreign award.131  These common law countries pressed for the 
territory criterion in the Convention.  Additional countries also pointed out 
that the non-domestic criterion created ambiguities in definition.132  As each 
country has its own rules for determining non-domestic awards, one 
signatory state would encounter difficulty in predicting which awards would 
be considered non-domestic in another.133  Furthermore, the Colombian 
delegate emphasized that it was essential for the Convention to include an 
unequivocal criterion to ensure that each signatory state would “know 
exactly what the other States were undertaking to do.”134 
A Working Group of delegates from both civil law and common law 
countries was assigned to select a unanimous criterion.  The Working Group 
proposed a version similar to that of Article I(1) of today’s Convention.  At 
the time, the Working Group had an understanding that civil law countries 
could reserve the right to exclude “certain categories of arbitral awards from 
                                           
128
  Id. at 34.  
129
  The French delegate opined that “the draft—tended to attach an exaggerated importance to the 
place where the award was rendered.  Practice had shown that the place of pronouncement was often an 
insignificant factor, and the prominence given to it in the draft tended to obscure the strictly private nature 
of the arbitration operation.”  Id. at 33.  
130
  To this end, Italian delegates observed that “[t]he mere fact that an award had been made in a 
country other than that in which it was sought to be relied upon was not enough to make it a foreign award 
from the point of view of the country of enforcement.”  Id. at 33. 
131
  Id. at 34.  
132
  Turkey, El Salvador, Argentina, and Colombia shared the complaint.  Id. at 35-36.   
133
  The Columbian delegate argued at length about the importance of certainty in determining the 
scope of application of the Convention.  Id. at 36-37. 
134
  Id.  
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the application of the Convention.”135  Surprisingly, although the proposed 
text was voted on and adopted unanimously,136 the proposed exclusion 
reservation was omitted. 
The territory criterion was wholeheartedly incorporated into the final, 
combined criteria.  Application of this criterion became absolute: all 
arbitration awards entered in a foreign territory are foreign awards to which 
the Convention shall apply.137  Meanwhile, the Convention also applies to 
any awards that were entered in the enforcing state if the domestic law 
considers the awards non-domestic.138  Inclusion of the non-domestic 
criterion, however, kept civil law countries from achieving their main goal 
of excluding certain awards that were entered in a foreign territory yet 
deemed domestic by the municipal laws of the country where enforcement 
was sought.  Furthermore, the criterion imposed a treaty obligation on both 
common law and civil law countries to apply the Convention to locally 
rendered arbitral awards that the enforcing country does not consider 
domestic.139  For example, German courts are compelled to apply the 
Convention to locally entered awards administered under French procedural 
laws.  In the real world, however, these requirements are rather abstract and 
amount “to little more than a hypothetical academic construct.”140   
It became clear that the compromise in Article 1 was in favor of 
common law countries having a territorial criterion.141  The Convention 
always applied to the recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award made 
in another state.  Because common law countries traditionally lacked a non-
domestic concept, the Convention’s non-domestic criterion did not increase 
any obligation on them.142  One scholar alleged that civil law countries “may 
                                           
135
  The Working Group submitted the final text of Article I “on the understanding that . . . the scope 
of application of the Convention may be qualified by such provisions as the Conference may adopt, 
enabling Contracting States to exclude certain categories of arbitral awards from the application of the 
Convention.”  ECOSOC, Report of Working Party No. 1 on Art. I, par. 1 and Art. II of the Draft 
Convention, U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/ L.42 (June 2, 1958).  Both Italian and German delegates proposed that 
individual states be permitted to ratify the Convention with a reservation to the effect that they would not 
apply it to certain awards rendered abroad but considered by them to be “domestic.” 
136
  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 38. 
137
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(3). 
138
  See Mark B. Feldman, An Award Made in New York Can Be a Foreign Arbitral Award, 39 ARB. J. 
14, 17 (1984) 
139
  Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983) (noting that the non-domestic 
criterion was desired by some countries “to preclude the enforcement of certain awards rendered abroad, 
not to enhance enforcement of awards rendered domestically”). 
140
  See Alan Scott Rau, The New York Convention in American Courts, 7 AM. REV. INT’L ARB. 213, 
223 (1996). 
141
  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 39.  
142
  For example, Chapter II of the FAA in the U.S. broke with common law tradition.  See 9 U.S.C. § 
202 (2004). 
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well have been sandbagged” in the final version of the Convention.143  
Ironically, years later, the United States, a traditionally common law country 
without any non-domestic award concept, aggressively advocated 
recognizing non-domestic awards in the context of applying the 
Convention.144 
B. Reciprocity Reservation  
Paragraph 3 of Article I of the Convention offers, inter alia, a 
reservation option to contracting states that allows them, on the basis of 
reciprocity, to limit the Convention’s application in awards recognition and 
enforcement proceedings to those awards made “in the territory of another 
Contracting State.”145  More than half of the 134 contracting states of the 
Convention declared the “reciprocity reservation” at the time of accession to 
the Convention.146  The language, “on the basis of the reciprocity,” indicates 
that the purpose of the reservation is to allow a contracting state to limit 
Convention benefits to the group of contracting states.  The reservation is 
applicable to the entire Convention, rather than just any isolated article.147  
The ambiguity in the phrase, however, has led courts in certain contracting 
states to adopt an entirely different interpretation.  These states have 
understood the reservation to limit the application of the Convention to 
awards made “in the territory of another Contracting State,”148 rather than 
awards made within the contracting state where recognition and enforcement 
were sought.149  In this light, the “Reciprocity Reservation” allows a 
contracting state to preclude the Convention from applying to those awards 
that are entered locally yet considered non-domestic by municipal law.  
The latter interpretation is neither logical nor supported by legislative 
history.  The New York Convention was made to replace the Geneva 
Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, a 1927 treaty 
insufficient in fulfilling the purposes of recognition and enforcement of 
                                           
143
  Rau, supra note 140, at 223.  
144
  See Bergesen, 710 F.2d 928; see also infra Part IV.B. 
145
  See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(3) (stating that it is “[w]hen signing, ratifying or 
acceding to this Convention[,] . . . any State may on the basis of reciprocity declare that it will apply 
the Convention to the recognition and enforcement of awards made only in the territory of another 
Contracting State”).  Another reservation option is offered for limiting the application of the Convention to 
commercial arbitration.  See id.  
146
  As of July 14, 2004, approximately 70 contracting states out of a total of 135 had declared the 
reciprocity reservation.  See U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law website, Status of Text, 
http://www.uncitral.org/en-index.htm (last visited May 7, 2004). 
147
  See New York Convention, supra note 3, art I(3). 
148
  Id. (emphasis added); see also Lander Co. v. MMP Inv., 927 F. Supp. 1078, 1080 (N.D. Ill. 1996). 
149
  Rau, supra note 140, at 225. 
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foreign arbitral awards.150  The Geneva Convention provided a reciprocity 
principle, not a reservation, that an arbitral award must be enforced if the 
“said award has been made in a territory of one of the High Contracting 
Parties” and “between persons who are subject to the jurisdiction of one of 
the High Contracting Parties.”151  The New York Convention was believed to 
further advance this by expanding its application to all foreign and non-
domestic awards regardless of whether they were entered in a contracting 
state.152  The Convention included the “reciprocity reservation” to address 
certain countries’ unwillingness to extend their obligation to those non-
contracting states that do not enforce awards from contracting states.153  
Legislative history revealed that the “reciprocity reservation” was offered as 
an option to limit the application of the Convention to foreign awards 
entered in non-contracting states.  This “if they won’t enforce our awards, 
we won’t enforce theirs” understanding has been generally accepted as the 
reason for the adoption of the “reciprocity reservation” under the 
Convention.154 
The major advocates for the non-domestic criterion (Germany, France, 
the Netherlands, and Belgium) all declared the “reciprocity reservation” in 
their accession to the New York Convention.155  These civil law countries 
had aggressively advocated making the non-domestic criterion the only rule 
for the Convention.156  Therefore, it would seem implausible that these 
countries would declare a reservation to avoid applying the Convention to 
non-domestic awards.  Their declaration, therefore, can only be explained by 
their intent to limit Convention treatment to member countries. 
                                           
150
  Id. at 226. 
151
  Geneva Convention on the Execution of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 92 L.N.T.S. 301, art. 1 (1927), 
reprinted in W.M. REISMAN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: CASES, MATERIALS AND 
NOTES ON THE RESOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS DISPUTES, DOCUMENTARY SUPPLEMENT 36 
(1997) (emphases added). 
152
  Rau, supra note 140, at 226-28. 
153
  Comments by Governments on the Draft Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards, U.N. Doc. E/2822, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
NEW YORK CONVENTION, at III.A.2.36-37, III.A.2.54 (Giorgio Gaja ed., 1985) (Netherlands); id. at 
III.A.2.39 (United Kingdom); id. at III.A.2.49-51 (Yugoslavia). 
154
  Rau, supra note 140, at 226-27. 
155
  U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958-Convention on the Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
NYConvention_status.html (last visited June 1, 2006). 
156
  See U.N. Doc. E/CONF.26/SR.3, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION: 
NEW YORK CONVENTION, supra note 153, at III C.4.  
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C. Definition of Non-Domestic Awards  
The Convention concluded with an inclusion of the non-domestic 
criterion but without a definition of “non-domestic awards.”  Standards for 
determining the non-domestic awards vary from one country to another.  
Among them, European civil law scholars hold a prevailing theory that 
whether an award is non-domestic is determined by the applicable 
arbitration law.157  Under this theory, a locally entered award is considered 
non-domestic if, as a result of the parties’ choice of law, it is governed by the 
arbitration law of another country.158  Advocates of the theory rely on the 
following reasoning to support their position.  First, the legislative history of 
the New York Convention indicates that a non-domestic award is primarily 
determined by the applicable arbitration law.159  Second, implementation 
legislation for the New York Convention in civil law countries, such as 
Germany, has confirmed this method.160  Third, Convention text, such as that 
in Article V, indicates that non-domestic awards are those entered locally 
under the law of another state.161  Therefore, as a leading European scholar 
claims, the appropriate conventional interpretation should be that “the 
arbitration procedural law determines non-domestic awards.”162 
Even so, the language of the Convention does not limit non-domestic 
awards to those entered locally under foreign procedural laws.  Instead, the 
Convention offers each contracting state the authority to define non-
domestic awards.  The second sentence of Article I(1) of the Convention 
reads, “[The Convention] shall also apply to arbitral awards not considered 
as domestic awards in the State where their recognition and enforcement are 
sought”163 (emphases added).  Therefore, to properly determine whether an 
award is non-domestic, one must look to the municipal law of the state 
where recognition and enforcement are sought.  The language plainly 
implies that the Convention allows variations in the non-domestic definition 
                                           
157
  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 42-43.  
158
  Id. at 43 
159
  For records of the participating delegates’ discussions and statements on the non-domestic 
criterion issue, please see documents for the Conference reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION: NEW YORK CONVENTION, supra note 153, at III. 
160
  See van den Berg, supra note 125, at 42-43 (pointing out that German law would consider a local 
award entered under foreign procedural law a non-domestic award, and the New York Convention would 
apply to such an award in Germany).  
161
  See id. at 43 (claiming that Article V of the New York Convention indicates the applicable law 
chosen by parties is foreign law and different from the law of the country where the award was made); see 
also New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V.  
162
  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 43. 
163
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1).  
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across different countries.  As a result of this flexibility in interpretation, 
controversies have broken out in courtrooms around the world. 
IV. APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION IN THE U.S. COURTS  
A. The Convention Act and the Convention  
The United States has been a member of the New York Convention 
since 1970.164  The provisions of the Convention, however, do not apply 
directly to the U.S. courts, but rather through domestic legislation—the 
Convention Act.165  Adopted as a condition during accession to the 
Convention, the Convention Act was meant not only to implement the 
Convention provisions in U.S. Courts, but also to incorporate domestic 
substantive and procedural rules for enforcing the Convention.166  
The scope of application of the New York Convention, set forth in the 
Convention Act, takes a different approach from Article I(1) of the New 
York Convention.  The Convention Act adopted neither the territory nor the 
non-domestic criterion.167  Instead, Section 202 of the act assumed a broader 
scope that applies the Convention to all commercial arbitration awards and 
agreements except those arising from an exclusive legal relationship among 
citizens of the United States without reasonable relations to a foreign 
state.168   
By merging their implementing legislation with the Convention, the 
U.S. courts apply the Convention to two major categories: (1) arbitration 
awards entered in a foreign territory except those falling within the 
“reciprocity reservation”;169 and, (2) all arbitration awards entered in the 
United States, except for those between two United States citizens without 
any foreign connection.  Little problem has existed when applying the 
                                           
164
  The Convention became effective in the United States on December 29, 1970.  The United States 
was an original participating member in the United Nations’ Conference that produced the 1958 New York 
Convention.  Upon the conclusion of the New York Convention in 1958, the U.S. delegation to the 
Conference recommended the United States not accede to the Convention.  The delegation’s concerns were 
that implementation of the Convention would conflict with state anti-arbitration laws, and the United States 
lacked a sufficient domestic legal basis for accepting the Convention.  See Quigley, supra note 106, at 
1074-75. 
165
  9 U.S.C. § 201 (the Convention Act became Part II of the FAA, §§ 201-208).    
166 
 9 U.S.C. §§ 201-208. 
167 
 New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I; see 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
168 
 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
169  When consenting to adoption of the Convention, the U.S. Senate declared, “The United States of 
America will apply the Convention, on the basis of reciprocity, to the recognition and enforcement of only 
those awards made in the territory of another Contracting State.”  21 U.S.T. 2517.   
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Convention to awards in the first category.170  Application to awards in the 
second category, on the other hand, has sparked controversial debate both 
within U.S. courtrooms and among international commentators.  
It appears that the qualified Convention awards, as defined in the U.S. 
legislation, are broader than those defined in Article I of the Convention.  A 
basic reading of Section 202 of the Convention Act indicates that any 
foreign involvement may bring an award under the Convention.171  The 
scope of application of the New York Convention is specifically and clearly 
defined.  Unsurprisingly, the expansion of the scope in the Convention Act 
brought an onslaught of criticism.172  
For an arbitration agreement, on the other hand, § 202 imposes a 
“somewhat more restrictive” requirement on the application of the 
Convention.173  Article II of the Convention simply requires “each 
Contracting State” to recognize an arbitration agreement in writing without 
restricting it to foreign-related or international agreements.174  However, 
Section 202 excludes arbitration agreements made solely between two U.S. 
citizens who have no foreign connections.175  Furthermore, the Convention 
Act authorizes original jurisdiction in federal courts over actions and 
proceedings arising under the Convention.176 
B. Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp.: The First Attempt to Define Non-
Domestic Awards  
1. The Bergesen Decision  
No U.S. court addressed in detail the non-domestic concept or the 
scope of application of the Convention until the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals decision in Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp. in 1983.177  The widely 
                                           
170
  But see Jones v. Sea Tow Services, 30 F.3d 360, 365-66 (2d Cir. 1994) (challenging the territory 
criterion); discussion infra Part IV.D.  
171
  See 9 U.S.C. § 202. 
172
  See discussion infra Part IV.  
173
  McMahon, supra note 109, at 739.  
174
  21 U.S.T. 2517, art. II(1).  
175
  9 U.S.C. § 202 (2004) (corporations are U.S. citizens if they are incorporated or have their 
principal places of business in the U.S.).  
176
  See 9 U.S.C. § 203 (providing federal courts with original jurisdiction regardless of the amount in 
controversy).  
177
  Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983).  In various instances, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals and other district courts in that circuit have touched on the issue of 
application of the Convention to locally entered awards, but none of them has fully discussed the issue.  
See, e.g., Andros Compania Maritima, S.A. v. Marc Rich & Co., A.G., 579 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1978) (noting 
the issue of application of the Convention to local arbitration awards was “intriguing,” but did not need to 
430 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 2 
 
cited Bergesen case involved a dispute between a Norwegian ship owner, 
Bergesen, and a Swiss company, Joseph Muller Corp., which arose from 
issues of performance of international transportation contracts.  The dispute 
was arbitrated in New York City according to the arbitration clauses 
contained in the contracts, and the arbitral award was entered in favor of 
Bergesen.178  After Bergesen tried unsuccessfully to enforce the award in 
Switzerland, he petitioned the United States District Court for the Southern 
District of New York to confirm the arbitration award.  The district court 
confirmed the award, holding that the Convention applied to an award 
rendered in the United States involving foreign interests.  Joseph Muller 
Corp. appealed, and the circuit court affirmed the district court’s decision 
with elaborate analyses of the non-domestic concept and the scope of the 
Convention’s application.179 
In determining the issue of what qualifies for a non-domestic award 
under the Convention, the court declared that the definition of a non-
domestic award “appears to have been left out deliberately in order to cover 
as wide a variety of eligible awards as possible, while permitting the 
enforcing authority to supply its own definition of ‘non-domestic’ in 
conformity with its own national law.”180  Furthermore, the court decided 
that a non-domestic award is an award “made within the legal framework of 
another country.”  The Court gave two examples that fall within the 
definition: (1) those awards made in accordance with a foreign law; and, (2) 
those awards involving parties domiciled or having their principal place of 
business outside the enforcement jurisdiction.181  The Court reasoned that 
this broader construction was preferred because “it [was] more in line with 
the intended purpose” of the Convention: to encourage the recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitration awards.182 
Muller argued that the “reciprocity reservation” adopted by the United 
States should be considered, and that the Convention should be interpreted 
narrowly.183  The district court did not adopt Muller’s argument; rather, it 
held that the treaty language “should be interpreted broadly to effectuate its 
                                                                                                                              
be decided in the case since the application of the Domestic FAA sufficiently resolved the issue); see also, 
Transmarine Seaways Corp. v. Marc Rich & Co. A. G., 480 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y 1979) (holding that § 
202 of the Convention applied to the award entered in New York City since the two parties were foreign 
companies). 
178
  Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 928. 
179
  Id. at 929-30. 
180
  Id.  
181
  Id. at 932.  
182
  See id. at 932 (citing Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506 (1974) in supporting the policy 
argument).  
183
  Id.  
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recognition and enforcement purpose.”184  The circuit court failed, however, 
to elaborate the reciprocity reservation.185 
The court further examined the issue of whether § 202 of the 
Convention Act covered the disputed award.  After reviewing the legislative 
history, the court dictated that § 202 was intended to ensure the enforcement 
of arbitral awards with reasonable foreign relationships.186  The court further 
concluded that in enacting § 202, Congress did not desire to exclude 
application of the New York Convention to an arbitral award entered in the 
United States between two foreign parties.187   
2. Criticisms of the Bergesen Decision  
The Bergesen decision profoundly influenced “non-domestic awards” 
in U.S. courts.188  Thus far, the Second Circuit has followed the decision in 
jurisdictions where Bergesen is binding legal authority.  In several other 
circuits, Bergesen is also considered influential authority.189  Not 
surprisingly, the Bergesen decision triggered complex responses in the 
United States and other countries.  American commentators generally 
believed that the broader application of the Convention, as set forth in 
Bergesen, was a positive approach that would promote U.S. cities as seats of 
international commercial arbitration.190  The decision was also praised for 
promoting the enforcement of foreign arbitral awards by encouraging 
                                           
184
  Id. at 933. 
185
  Id.  
186
  See id. (citing legislative history at H.R. Rep. No. 91-1181 (1970), as reprinted in 1970 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3601, 3602).  
187
  See id.  The court stated that if Congress had desired to exclude arbitral awards rendered in the 
United States and involving foreign parties, it would have done so.  It also analyzed other sections to 
support its conclusion.  The Court noted that § 203 had been held to provide jurisdiction for disputes 
involving two noncitizens, and that § 206 had been interpreted as applying to arbitration occurring in places 
“within or without the United States.”  See id.  
188
  Bergesen has been cited in fifty-five cases in U.S. district courts and circuit courts of appeal in the 
Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth circuits, and has been cited forty-nine times in law review articles.  
Shepard’s Summary at LexisNexis, Bergesen, 710 F.2d 928.   
189
  As of May 2004, seven cases followed Bergesen’s rule.  Productos Mercantiles e Industriales, S.A. 
v. Faberge U.S.A., 23 F.3d 41 (2d Cir. 1994); Dworkin-Cosell Interair Courier Servs., Inc. v. Avraham, 728 
F. Supp. 156 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Trans Chem., Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. 
Supp. 266 (S.D. Tex. 1997); Jacada (Europe), Ltd. v. Int'l Mktg. Strategies, Inc., 255 F. Supp. 2d 744 
(W.D. Mich. 2003); Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997); Lloyd's, London v. Argonaut 
Ins. Co., 264 F. Supp. 2d 926 (N.D. Cal. 2003). 
190
  See, e.g., Feldman, supra note 138, at 16 (claiming that the Bergesen decision has “strengthened 
New York City’s potential to become a major center of international commercial arbitration”); see also 
William Phillips, Case Comment, Recognition of Foreign Arbitral Awards: The Second Circuit Provides a 
Hospitable Forum, 10 BROOKLYN J. INT’L L. 489 (1984); Hans Smit, A-National Arbitration,  63 TUL. L. 
REV. 629, 643-44 (1989) (referring to Bergesen as an “enlightened example” applauded by most because it 
“properly recognizes the need to provide the broadest possible recognition to arbitral awards”). 
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arbitrations as an alternative to litigation, and for enabling American 
businessmen to demand enforcement under the Convention in a foreign 
country when U.S. law was chosen as the applicable law for the 
arbitration.191 
European commentators criticized the Bergesen decision however, for 
reaching beyond the boundaries of the Convention, and argued that such an 
approach threatened the implementation of the Convention.192  Their 
challenges were based on the legislative history of both the Convention and 
the U.S. Convention Act.  Commentators have also claimed that the 
legislative history of the Convention indicates that non-domestic awards are 
those entered in arbitrations governed by foreign law,193 and that the 
nationality of the parties does not impact the scope of the application of the 
Convention.194  In addition, critics claim that the legislative history of the 
U.S. Convention Act reveals that the drafters did not intend the Convention 
to include locally rendered awards between two foreign parties.195 
The real concern of the critics was that application of the Convention 
to locally entered awards involving two foreign parties would make U.S. 
enforcement of the awards more cumbersome.  First, the enforcement of 
such awards might be subject to challenges from a losing party under both 
the Domestic FAA and the Convention.196  Second, application of the 
Convention could impose a higher standard for written agreements than the 
lesser requirements in the U.S. Domestic FAA.197  Finally, the expansive 
interpretation would make it more difficult for foreign courts to determine 
                                           
191
  Susan P. Brown, Recent Development, Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards—The United 
Nations Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 14 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. 
L. 217, 230-33 (1984).  The claim was based on the observation that the legal regime applicable to 
domestic arbitration in many contracting states to the New York Convention is significantly less liberal 
than the regime applicable to the enforcement under the Convention.  Feldman, supra note 138, at 18. 
192
  The most serious challenge was from Dr. Albert Jan van den Berg, Secretary of Netherlands 
Arbitration Institute and General Editor for Year Book Commercial Arbitration.  See van den Berg, supra 
note 125; see also Filip de Ly, The Place of Arbitration in the Conflict of Laws of International 
Commercial Arbitration: An Exercise in Arbitration Planning, 12 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 48, 77 (1991).  de 
Ly, an Associate Professor at University of Urecht, criticized Bergesen as a case inspired by U.S. law and 
one which may pose a threat to the New York Convention-based system, characterized by judicial review 
of the award in the home country and by relatively limited control in the enforcing country.  Id. 
193
  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 43.  
194
  Id. at 47.  
195
  Id. at 50. 
196
  A losing party may defend itself in recognition and enforcement proceedings according to the 
Convention Act and the Convention.  In addition, a losing party may petition to set aside the award under 
either Chapter I of the Domestic FAA, or state arbitration law.  Id. at 55. 
197
  The New York Convention requires a more stringent written form than do the Domestic FAA or 
the arbitration laws of most U.S. states.  Id. at 56; see also New York Convention, supra note 3, art. II(2).  
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the applicability of the Convention to an award that was entered through 
application of the New York law.198   
European commentators admitted, however, that the Bergesen 
decision “makes the United States a more hospitable forum for foreign 
parties intending to arbitrate within the United States.199  Applying the 
Convention to an award between two foreign parties grants federal 
jurisdiction to U.S. courts in enforcing the award which they would not 
otherwise have due to a lack of the required diversity elements.200   
Overall, the benefits of the Bergesen rule outweigh its shortcomings.  
When a party appropriately cites the Convention as a basis for the 
enforcement of an award, the Convention becomes an independent basis for 
enforcement and a losing party cannot challenge it based on the domestic 
FAA.  Moreover, a foreign court’s difficulty in predicting U.S. law is an 
occasional occurrence and is outweighed by the benefits obtained by the 
high volume of non-domestic awards enforced in the United States.  
Furthermore, the written format required by the Convention is generally not 
an issue in such a highly commercialized business world.  
C. Lander Co. v. MMP Investments: “Reciprocity Reservation” Clarified 
1. Unresolved Issues in Bergesen and the Facts of Lander 
While Bergesen only represents an initial attempt to expand the 
application of the Convention in U.S. Courts, Lander Co. v. MMP 
Investments is a leading case in defining non-domestic awards in the United 
States.201  The Bergesen Court used a specific factor, the nationalities of the 
parties, as a basis for claiming that the award was made within the legal 
framework of another country.202  However, the court neither addressed the 
relationship between the Convention Act and the Convention, nor did it 
                                           
198
  The critics presented the case of a German court asked to enforce an award between Swiss and 
German parties by applying the New York law.  The German court was uncertain whether the New York 
law expanded the application of the Convention.  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 57. 
199
  Id. at 50. 
200
  Chapter One of the FAA (the Domestic FAA) does not create independent jurisdiction.  Two 
foreign parties are not qualified for diversity jurisdiction.  See 28 U.S.C. §1331 (federal question 
jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. §1331 (diversity jurisdiction).   
201
  Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 927 F. Supp. 1078 (N. D. Ill. 1996) (Lander I); Lander Co. v. MMP 
Invs., 107 F.3d 476 (7th Cir. 1997) (Lander II).  
202
  Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983). 
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clarify whether the “reciprocity reservation” impacts “non-domestic” 
awards.203  Such issues were first examined and clarified in Lander. 
The facts of Lander are not complicated.  In February 1993, Lander 
Co., a New Jersey company, and MMP Investment, an Illinois company, 
entered into two contracts for Lander’s shampoo and other products to be 
distributed by MMP Investment in Poland.204  The contracts provided that 
any disputes would be settled by binding arbitration pursuant to the Rules of 
Conciliation and Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”).  The contracts further stipulated that the arbitration would be 
conducted in New York City and the agreement would be construed in 
accordance with New York state law.205  When both parties’ performance fell 
short, MMP Investment initiated an arbitration proceeding.  The arbitration 
was structured in accordance with the ICC Rules in New York City and an 
award was entered in favor of Lander in October 1995.206  Lander petitioned 
the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois to confirm the 
arbitration award under the Convention.  Though Lander alleged that there 
was federal jurisdiction under the FAA, the Convention Act and on the basis 
of diversity, the district court dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction.207  
The appellate court however, reversed the decision and elaborated on several 
previously unresolved issues pertinent to non-domestic awards.208 
2. Reciprocity Reservation  
The Bergesen court deferred ruling on whether the United States’ 
reciprocity reservation limits the recognition of non-domestic awards.209  In 
Lander, the district court offered a bold but unsupported interpretation of the 
reciprocity reservation.  Without examining its context and legislative 
history, the district court jumped to a conclusion that the reciprocity 
reservation, by its express terms, limits “the enforcement and recognition of 
arbitral awards on a territorial basis, to those made in a country other than 
the United States.”210 
                                           
203
  See Bergesen, 710 F. 2d at 932-33 (responding to the argument that the court should interpret the 
Convention narrowly based on the reciprocity reservation the U.S. adopted, the court did not address 
whether the reciprocity reservation prevents the Convention from applying to awards entered in the United 
States).  
204
  Lander II, 107 F.3d at 478. 
205
  Id. 
206
  Lander I, 927 F. Supp. at 1079. 
207
  Id. at 1078, 1081-82. 
208
  Lander II, 107 F.3d at 482. 
209
  See Bergesen, 710 F.2d at 932-33 (stating vaguely that the treaty language should be interpreted 
broadly on the issue of reciprocity reservation).  
210
  Lander I, 927 F. Supp. at 1081-82 (emphasis added). 
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The district court, citing Bergesen, further stated that the definition of 
non-domestic awards in § 202 of the U.S. Convention Act did not affect the 
court’s interpretation.211  The court viewed § 202 as a limitation created by 
Congress to exclude awards entered in foreign territories between two U.S. 
parties without any other foreign connection.212  The court concluded that 
because the “reciprocity reservation” made by the United States “effectively 
negates the non-domestic award option of Article I(1)” of the Convention, 
there would have been no need for the U.S. Convention Act to define non-
domestic awards.213 
The appellate court reversed in whole the lower court’s decision 
concerning the impact of the “reciprocity reservation” on non-domestic 
awards.214  The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the 
“reciprocity reservation” declaration should be understood to mean that the 
United States would only enforce arbitral awards made by contracting 
parties that adhere to the Convention.215  Creatively, the court stated that the 
reservation was intended to limit the United States to applying the 
Convention to arbitral awards made in the territory of “another signatory of 
the Convention, like the United States, as opposed to non-signatories.”216  
Such a liberal interpretation has generally been accepted in academia and by 
U.S. federal courts.217 
3. Overlap Between the Convention and the Convention Act 
In Lander, the appellate court went further than Bergesen by 
analyzing the relationship between the Convention and § 202 of the 
Convention Act.  It determined that § 202 was broader than the 
Convention218 and that a broader application of the New York Convention 
under § 202 was valid because Congress has appropriate commerce power to 
expand § 202 beyond the Convention.219   
                                           
211
  Id. at 1081.  
212
  See id. at 1081 (asserting that the language of § 202 is “cast in terms of exclusion rather than 
inclusion”).  
213
  Id. (citing van den Berg’s article, the court asserted that if Congress had intended to define non-
domestic awards, Congress should have done so in the legislation).  
214
  Lander II, 107 F.3d at 482. 
215
  Id. at 481-82. 
216
  Id. at 482 (emphases added).  
217
  See, e.g., Rau, supra note 140, at 226 (stating that the interpretation in the Lander case of the 
reciprocity reservation is abundantly supported both by history and common sense); see also Trans Chem., 
Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 294 (S.D. Tex. 1997). 
218
  Lander II, 107 F.3d at 482. 
219
  Id. (stating that “the statute is comfortably within Congress’s commerce power”). 
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In determining the scope of § 202, the circuit court read the statute to 
exclude only those arbitration awards or agreements arising from a 
relationship entirely between U.S. citizens and without any foreign factor.220  
The court offered three possible legislative incentives for this interpretation 
of § 202: (1) to broaden the scope of the application of the Convention with 
the goal of attracting arbitration business to New York; (2) to secure for 
American businesses the benefits of judicial enforcement of awards entered 
on the basis of reciprocity in the country where the enforcement is sought; 
and (3) to simplify procedures governing the foreign activities of American 
firms, regardless of the nationality of the parties.221 
The court also explored the issue of overlap between the Convention 
and the U.S. Convention Act.  When a party chooses to enforce a qualified 
award under the Convention, the party’s other legal remedies are not 
correspondingly eliminated.222  After examining the legislative history of 
both the Convention and the Convention Act, the court claimed that it could 
not find any suggestion that the Convention is exclusive.223  On the contrary, 
Article VII of the Convention provides that it will not “deprive any 
interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral 
award in the manner and to the extent allowed by the law or the treaties of 
the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.”224  Therefore, 
parties have discretion to choose Article I, § 202, or both, in seeking to 
enforce arbitral awards.225 
4. Comments  
The Court’s narrow interpretation of the “reciprocity reservation” 
significantly alters the application of the Convention.226  The interpretation 
                                           
220
  Id.  
221
  See id. (noting that “[w]hatever Congress’s precise thinking on the matter, it spoke clearly [in the 
statute itself]”). 
222
  Id. at 481 ("Article VII of the Convention provides that the Convention shall not ‘deprive any 
interested party of any right he may have to avail himself of an arbitral award in the manner and to the 
extent allowed by the law or the treaties of the country where such award is sought to be relied upon.’”) 
223
  Id.  
224
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. VII; Lander II, 107 F.3d at 481 (“[T]here is ‘no reason to 
assume that Congress did not intend to provide overlapping coverage between the Convention and the 
Federal Arbitration Act.’”) (citing Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 934 (2d Cir. 1983)). 
225
  Lander II, 107 F.3d at 481-82.  
226
  See Jennifer Dawn Nicholson, Recent Development: Lander Co., Inc. v. MMP Investments, Inc., 
13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 287, 296, 298 (1997) (noting “if the holding in Lander is adopted 
universally it could significantly enlarge the number of domestic arbitral awards which will be enforced 
under the New York Convention,” and predicting that “[i]ncreased use of the New York Convention may 
lead to the greater enforcement of arbitral awards and agreements in the U.S. in terms of international 
commerce”). 
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qualifies many domestically entered awards as Convention awards and 
makes it less likely that they will be vacated under the Domestic FAA.227  
Under § 208, the Convention Act will prevail over the Domestic FAA in the 
enforcement of foreign awards.228  Once characterized as a Convention 
award, only seven enumerated grounds in the Convention may be cited for 
the denial of enforcement; the scrutiny of the Domestic FAA does not 
apply.229  Such a "pro-enforcement" policy for foreign arbitral awards has 
been long established in case law.230  If an award is both qualified for 
enforcement under the Domestic FAA and the Convention Act, a winning 
party is likely to choose the latter as a legal basis. 
The Lander rule has been followed by the Fifth Circuit.231  Such a 
favorable ruling is certain to make foreign parties feel more comfortable in 
seeking legal protection under the Convention rather than being forced to 
rely on domestic laws. 
Applying the Convention to a broader scope of non-domestic awards 
has significant consequences.232  First, it offers independent federal 
jurisdiction.233  Second, Convention awardees enjoy a three-year statute of 
limitations to initiate proceedings rather than the one-year statute of 
limitations under the Domestic FAA.234  Third, the Convention Act allows a 
court to compel parties to arbitrate in or outside the United States,235 while 
the Domestic FAA limits a court to compelling parties to arbitrate “within 
the district.”236  The broader application of the New York Convention will 
undoubtedly provide more legal options for American businesses, both 
domestically and abroad, and will make the United States more attractive for 
arbitration and foreign investment.237  
                                           
227
  Id. 
228
  9 U.S.C. § 208.  
229
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V.  
230
  Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de l'Industrie du Papier (RAKTA), 508 
F.2d 969, 973 (2d Cir. 1974). 
231
  Trans Chem., Ltd. v. China Nat'l Mach. Import & Export Corp., 978 F. Supp. 266, 294 (S.D. Tex. 
1997). 
232
  See Rau, supra note 140, at 215-17 (detailing the significant impact of the application of the 
Convention to an arbitration agreement or an arbitration award). 
233 
 The implementing legislation, the Convention Act, offers independent federal jurisdiction for 
arbitration awards or agreements under the Convention.  See 9 U.S.C. §203. 
234 
 See Domestic FAA, 9 U.S.C. §9 (providing one-year of statute of limitation for confirming an 
award); see also The Convention Act, 9 U.S.C. §207 (providing three-year statute of limitations to confirm 
an award under the Convention).  
235
  9 U.S.C. § 206. 
236
  9 U.S.C. § 4.  
237
  See Feldman, supra note 138, at 21. 
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D. Jones v. Sea Tow Services: A Drawback on the Territory Criterion  
There is little confusion about the territory criterion, requiring that the 
Convention shall apply to “arbitral awards made in the territory of a State 
other than the State where the recognition and enforcement of such awards 
are sought.” 238  It is clear that when an award is made in a foreign nation, it 
is considered a foreign award in a contracting state and the Convention 
applies.239  However, the territory criterion was challenged in a U.S. court as 
a result of the ambiguity in the language of § 201 of the U.S. implementation 
legislation.  Jones v. Sea Tow Services offers a good illustration of the 
amplified conflicts between the U.S. domestic legislation and the New York 
Convention.240 
1. A Brief Summary of the Case 
On a stormy night in 1991, Mr. and Mrs. Jones were on their thirty-
three-foot pleasure boat when the boat capsized near the shore.  A local 
salvage firm named Sea Tow Services was contacted, and its representatives 
arrived in a land vehicle.  Mr. Jones then signed a Lloyd's Standard Form of 
Salvage Agreement, commonly known as LOF, handed over by the captain 
of the land vehicle.  The LOF contained statements throughout the document 
that any disputes under the agreement were subject to arbitration in London, 
England, and that English law would apply.  Sea Tow Services’ 
representatives towed the boat to a marina and sought payment of $15,000 
for their services.241  After encountering difficulty collecting, Sea Tow 
Services initiated an arbitration proceeding against the Joneses in London.  
The Joneses filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Eastern 
District of New York and requested a declaration that the LOF was 
unenforceable based on fraud.  A stay of the arbitration proceedings 
commenced in London.  The Joneses argued that the New York Convention 
did not apply to the agreement because both parties were American citizens 
and the event occurred in U.S. waters.  Sea Tow Services responded that the 
LOF arbitration clause deprived the court of jurisdiction over the dispute and 
that Sea Tow Services was entitled to an order compelling arbitration.242  
The District Court ruled that the Convention was applicable and ordered the 
                                           
238
  New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I(1). 
239
  van den Berg, supra note 125, at 39. 
240
  Jones v. Sea Tow Servs., 30 F.3d 360 (2d Cir. 1994) (Jones II). 
241
  Jones v. Sea Tow Servs., 828 F. Supp. 1002, 1005 (E.D.N.Y 1993) (Jones I). 
242
  Id. at 1006. 
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dispute resolved in London per the arbitration clause.243  The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals reversed the decision and denied the application of the 
New York Convention to the dispute.244   
2. The “Foreign Connection” Under Section 202 
U.S. courts have developed a four-question formula to determine 
whether an agreement or an award qualifies for application of the 
Convention under § 202 of the Convention Act.245  The formula requires 
affirmative answers to all of the following four questions to secure 
application of the Convention:  (1) whether there is an agreement in writing 
to arbitrate the subject of the dispute; (2) whether the agreement provides for 
arbitration in the territory of a signatory of the Convention; (3) whether the 
agreement arises out of a legal relationship, contractual or not, which is 
considered commercial; and (4) whether a party to the agreement is a foreign 
citizen or the relationship involves property located abroad, envisages 
performance or enforcement abroad, or has some other reasonable relation to 
one or more foreign states.246  Upon reaching affirmative answers to all of 
these questions, a court must order arbitration unless it finds the agreement 
“null and void.”247  The district court in Jones adopted this four-question 
formula and reached affirmative answers to the first three questions.248  After 
a careful analysis of, and comparison to, previous decisions, the trial court 
ruled that the selection of English law and its designation of London as the 
location of arbitration “constitute[s] a reasonable commercial relationship 
with the United Kingdom or indicates that the parties envisaged enforcement 
abroad.”  The Convention was, therefore, applicable to the dispute.249 
                                           
243
  See id. at 1018 (holding that “[P]laintiff’s motion for summary judgment is denied insofar as it 
requests a declaration that [the Convention] does not apply to the LOF”).   
244
  Jones II, 30 F.3d at 366. 
245
  The court cited multiple cases (e.g., Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 186-87 (1st Cir. 
1982), and Cargill Int’l S.A. v. M/T Pav Dybenko, 991 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1993)). 
246
  Jones I, 828 F. Supp. at 1015. 
247
  Id.; see also Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies, Ltd., 969 F.2d 953, 959 (10th Cir. 1992); 
Ledee v. Ceramiche Ragno, 684 F.2d 184, 187 (1st Cir. 1982). 
248
  Jones I, 828 F. Supp. at 1015. 
249
  In examining the fourth question, the Court recognized that there were previous non-authoritative 
cases ruling that LOF connections to a foreign forum and applicable foreign law did not sufficiently 
establish the relationship with a foreign nation as provided in § 202.  The court refused, however, to follow 
this reasoning.  See Reinholtz v. Retriever Marine Towing & Salvage, No. CV-92-14141, 1993 WL 414719 
(S.D. Fla. May 21, 1993); see also Brier v. Northstar Marine, Inc., No. 91-597(JFG), 1992 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 20931 (D.N.J. 1992); Jones II, 30 F.3d at 1015-18 (in reaching its conclusion, the court also 
analyzed the forum selection, and the policy of construing the Convention broadly so as to effect its 
purpose in furthering arbitration agreements on an international scale). 
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The Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the 
district court.  The appellate court found that the designation of London as 
the forum for arbitration, and the selection of English law did not satisfy the 
requirement of a reasonable foreign connection under § 202.250  Moreover, 
the appellate court found that the selection of British law was not 
appropriate because no significant portion of the performance occurred or 
was to occur in England.251  Furthermore, the Court found that the district 
court lacked jurisdiction to compel the arbitration in London since § 206 
does not apply to an arbitral agreement outside the scope of the 
Convention.252   
Isolated from the Convention, both the district and circuit courts 
analyzed § 202 on legitimate grounds.  However, it seems that both courts 
mistakenly targeted § 202 and missed the interplay between § 202 and the 
Convention.   
3. Does Section 202 Conflict with the New York Convention? 
The adoption of the territory criterion for the application of the 
Convention is unconditional among contracting parties.253  The one single 
determining element is the location of the arbitral award; a contracting state 
should apply the Convention to an award entered in another contracting 
state.254  This straightforward rule set forth by the Convention means that 
neither the nationality of the parties, the applicable law, the location for 
performance, nor the location of agreement executed impacts the application 
of the Convention to foreign awards. 
It is noteworthy that the Jones case deals with an agreement to 
arbitrate in a foreign country rather than with a foreign award.  However, by 
analogizing to Article I, the Convention should be read as requiring the 
enforcement of agreements that would in turn lead to foreign awards or non-
domestic awards.255  If a court has a Convention obligation to honor foreign 
awards but not to compel parties to arbitrate according to the agreement, the 
purpose of the Convention will be substantially undermined.  In fact, Article 
II of the Convention requires each contracting state to recognize arbitration 
                                           
250
  See Jones II, 30 F.3d at 365-66.  
251
  See id. at 366 (analogizing the testimony of an expert, Mr. Kearney, to the U.S. choice of law rule 
that “ordinarily the law chosen must be that of a jurisdiction where a significant enough portion of the 
making or performance of the contract is to occur or occurs”). 
252
  See id.; see also 9 U.S.C. § 206 (providing order to compel arbitration and appointment of 
arbitrators by a court having jurisdiction). 
253
  See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. I.   
254
  See id.  
255
  See Rau, supra note 140, at 233. 
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agreements in very general terms and without territorial conditions.256  This 
understanding is also supported by § 206 of the U.S. Convention Act, which 
requires courts to compel arbitration in any place as provided in the 
agreement, regardless of whether the location is within the United States.257  
In Jones, both the trial and appellate courts reasoned that the foreign 
connection criteria in § 202 was intended to restrict the application of the 
Convention.  The two courts reached different conclusions as to whether the 
facts in the case qualified as a foreign connection under § 202.  Such an 
approach however, was incorrect from the beginning.  If § 202 restricts 
foreign awards under the Convention, then it conflicts with Article I of the 
Convention.  Under Article I, enforcing foreign awards from contracting 
states is unconditional.  Restricting enforcement of foreign awards violates 
Convention rules.   
There is a reasonable alternative interpretation of § 202 that is 
consistent with Article I: the foreign connection condition was intended to 
restrict non-domestic awards made in the United States or agreements that 
would lead to such non-domestic awards.258  So far, however, U.S. courts 
have not taken this approach.  Several lower courts have adopted the 
reasoning of Jones,259 which is binding authority in the Second Circuit and 
influential authority around the country.   
Confused by ambiguities unanticipated by the drafters of the 
implementing legislation, experts have called for a legislative clarification of 
§ 202 and an official definition of international arbitration.260  Legislative 
clarification may resolve this issue, but one fundamental problem remains: 
the international Convention does not take precedence over domestic 
legislation in American courts.  Furthermore, a particular court’s incapacity 
or unwillingness to understand the purpose and intention of the Convention 
undermines its implementation.  Although most judges in U.S. courts are 
highly qualified, not all of them have an international vision, nor do all 
                                           
256
  See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. II. 
257
  See 9 U.S.C. § 206. 
258
  See id. (noting that if the function of § 202 is not to flout the Convention, then it must be 
interpreted as defining how far the Convention can be expanded, even as to awards rendered within the 
United States). 
259
  See, e.g., Reinholtz v. Retriever Marine Towing & Salvage, No. CV-92-14141 (S.D. Fla. May 21, 
1993); see also Brier v. Northstar Marine, Inc., 1992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20931, 1993 A.M.C. 1194 (D.N.J. 
1992). 
260
  See, e.g., Richard W. Hulbert, REPORT: Comment on a Proposed New Statute for International 
Arbitration, 13 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 153 (2002). 
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judges have extensive knowledge of international law.261  Convinced that the 
implementing legislation is specifically tailored to better serve U.S. interests, 
some judges simply ignore the original provisions in the Convention. 
The New York Convention was adopted to provide predictable 
procedural and substantive rules for enforcing arbitration awards and 
agreements.  The standards set to classify Convention agreements or awards 
are mandatory rules with which contracting states have an obligation to 
comply.  A contracting state’s domestic legislation or judicial interpretation 
jeopardizing convention provisions is a violation of the Convention.  In the 
Jones decision, the court went beyond reasonable limitation and created U.S. 
case law that is in conflict with the New York Convention.  Such an 
approach damages the reputation of U.S. courts in enforcing Convention 
awards or agreements.  U.S. courts should restrain from walking away from 
the guidelines set by the international community and uphold the goal of the 
Convention Act.262      
V. CHINA’S APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 
A. Narrow Interpretation of the Territory Reciprocity Reservation  
China became a member of the New York Convention on April 22, 
1987.263  In its accession document, China declared both a “reciprocity 
reservation” and a “commercial reservation.”264  The English version of the 
“reciprocity reservation” in China’s declaration copies the language from the 
                                           
261
  See, e.g., Rau, supra note 140, at 229 (using taunting language to criticize the trial court's decision 
in Lander for its misinterpretation of the “reciprocity reservation”:  “once one starts with a foolish premise, 
a foolish conclusion cannot be far behind”). 
262
  The purposes of the United States' accession to the convention were:  (1) to “encourage the 
recognition and enforcement of international arbitral awards;” (2) to relieve the courts of heavy caseloads; 
(3) to offer parties an alternative method for resolving disputes, which is “speedier and less costly than 
litigation;” (4) to provide American businesses with “a widely used system to obtain domestic enforcement 
of international commercial arbitration awards, subject only to minimal standards of domestic judicial 
review.”  Bergesen v. Joseph Muller Corp., 710 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Ultracashmere 
House, Ltd. v. Meyer, 664 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1981); G. Richard Shell, Trade Legalism and 
International Relations Theory: An Analysis of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 829, 888 
(1995). 
263
  See Decisions on China’s Accession to the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Award, adopted by the 18th Meeting of the 6th Session of the Standing Committee of the 
NPC on Dec. 2, 1986; see also Notice of the SPC Concerning the Implementation of the Convention on 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, issued by the SPC of China on Apr. 10, 1987, 
Fa (Jing) Fa [1987] No. 5, SUPREME COURT GAZETTE, June 20, 1987, at 40 [hereinafter SPC Notice 
Concerning the Convention]. 
264
  See Decisions on China’s Accession to the Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Award, supra note 263.  
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Convention.265  However, the Chinese language version of the declaration 
contains a clear limitation that only applies the Convention to awards from 
“another” contracting country, other than China.  In its implementing notice, 
the SPC explicitly emphasized in several places that the reciprocity 
reservation confines China’s application of the Convention only to arbitral 
awards made “within the territory of another contracting country,” not 
including China.266  This tight and clear Chinese language in the declaration 
and in the SPC’s notice does not offer any space for an alternative 
interpretation such as the one made by the U.S. court in Lander.267  Chinese 
courts and scholars have accepted the understanding that the “reciprocity 
reservation” is meant to exclude any domestically entered awards, regardless 
of their classification under Chinese law; therefore, China’s obligation under 
the Convention is limited to the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards rendered within the territory of another contracting party, not 
including China.268   
B. Non-Domestic Awards in China  
1. The Concept of “Foreign-Related Awards” 
In the Chinese legal system, the term “non-domestic award” is not 
clearly defined.  Instead, the concept of “foreign-related awards” has been 
developed for arbitration awards that are entered in the territory of China but 
which are not considered to be regular domestic awards under Chinese 
                                           
265
  See U.N. Commission on Inernational Trade Law, Status: 1958-Convention on the Recognition 
and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/ 
NYConvention_status.html (last visited June 1, 2006) (listing the declarations and reservations of various 
countries, including China).  
266
  See SPC Notice Concerning the Convention, supra note 263, art.1.  
267
  See Lander Co. v. MMP Invs., 107 F.3d 476, 482 (7th Cir. 1997) (concluding that “another 
Contracting State” in the reciprocity reservation was intended to mean “another signatory of the 
Convention, like the United States, as opposed to non-signatories”); see also New York Convention, supra 
note 3, art. I(1). 
268
  See Xiaowen Qiu, Enforcing Arbitral Awards Involving Foreign Parties: A Comparison of the 
United States and China, 11 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 607, 615 (2000) (noting that China foreclosed the 
possibility of applying the Convention to arbitral awards entered by CIETAC and CMAC at the time of its 
ratification of the Convention by the reservation; further commenting that China’s narrow interpretation 
language made in the reservation is allowed by the Convention); see also HANG SONG, 
《 国 国国国国国国及国 国 国际 际 际 》 》 RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF ARBITRAL AWARDS IN 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION）  (in Chinese) 243, (2000); JIAN HAN, 
《 代国 国国国国国及最 国 代现 际 现 现 》 THEORY AND PRACTICE OF MODERN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRATION (in Chinese) 475-6 (rev. ed. 2000) (citing the SPC’s Notice and also trying to define “made 
in a territory of another country”).  
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law.269  In other words, foreign-related awards in China are the equivalent of 
the non-domestic awards defined in the Convention.  However, as China 
intends to avoid disputes over the “reciprocity reservation,” the Chinese 
legislature and the courts do not use the term “non-domestic awards.”    
The concept of “foreign-related arbitral awards” first appeared in the 
1991 Civil Procedural Law of China.270  However, the law does not offer a 
clear definition of foreign-related arbitral awards.  Instead, the law stipulates 
the substantive procedures for the enforcement of awards entered by a 
“foreign-related arbitration institute.”271  The Civil Procedure Law implies 
that all awards entered by Chinese foreign-related arbitration institutions are 
“foreign-related awards.”  Such a mechanism is unusual, but it was practical 
before the implementation of the 1994 Arbitration Law, when the Chinese 
government authorized only two institutions, CIETAC and CMAC, to have 
jurisdiction over foreign-related arbitration.272  After the implementation of 
the 1994 Arbitration Law however, local arbitration commissions became 
eligible to take foreign-related cases and international arbitration institutes 
were eligible to take domestic cases.273  The nature of the institute therefore, 
is no longer a critical factor in defining “foreign-related awards.” 
In practice, Chinese courts have adopted a new definition of foreign-
related arbitration: arbitration for foreign-related cases.274  The definition of 
foreign-related cases has been pronounced in SPC’s legal interpretations.275  
According to a 1992 SPC interpretation implementing the 1991 Civil 
Procedure Law, a case is a “foreign-related case” if: (1) one or both parties 
are foreign nationals, stateless persons, or foreign companies or 
organizations; (2) the legal actions leading to formation, change, or 
                                           
269
  See generally XIANGSHU LIU, A JURISPRUDENTIAL STUDY ON THE INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL 
ARBITRAL AWARD SYSTEM OF CHINA (in Chinese) 1-22 (2001) (detailing the concept and definition of 
“foreign-related arbitration” in China and pointing out it serves to differentiate domestic arbitration). 
270
  See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 257-261.  Chapter 28, Arbitration (art. 257-261) 
was structured under Part Four, Special Stipulations for Civil Procedures Involving Foreign Interest. 
271
  See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, arts. 258-260; see also The Chinese SPC, Opinions 
Regarding to Various Issues Arising From the Application of the Civil Procedure Law of 1991 
》 最最最最国最 最关 《 中 最最中中国最国 国华 华华 》 及及 及 及问问 规 ） , art. 304 (issued July 14, 1992) (Chinese 
version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
272
  See ZHIDONG CHEN, supra note 47, 65-68.   
273
  See supra note 48 and accompanying text. 
274
  See JIAN HANG, supra note 268, at 469; see also XIANGSHU LIU, supra note 269, at 11-22 (citing 
more related sources as evidence that the rules defining foreign-related arbitration are based on the legal 
relationship).  
275
  See, e.g., Opinions on Several Issues Concerning the Implementation of the General Principles of 
Civil Law of People’s Republic of China (trial version), promulgated by SPC on Jan. 26, 1988 and 
published on Apr. 2, 1988, art. 178. 
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termination of the legal relationship occurred in a foreign country; or, (3) the 
subject matter of the dispute is located in a foreign country.276  
Although Chinese courts do not apply the New York Convention to 
foreign-related arbitral agreements or awards, the Chinese legal system does 
offer more favorable treatment to foreign-related arbitral awards than regular 
domestic awards.  The qualification of a dispute as a “foreign-related 
arbitration” therefore, has a significant legal consequence in China.   
2. Special Treatment for Foreign-Related Arbitration 
The narrow interpretation of the reciprocity reservation in China 
excludes the application of the New York Convention to the recognition and 
enforcement of any awards rendered in China.  However, China offers 
favorable treatment to foreign-related arbitration for the purpose of attracting 
foreign business.277  While Western countries have been very suspicious of 
the competence and fairness of the Chinese court system, arbitration has 
become a primary choice for foreign businesses resolving disputes in China.  
In addition, the Chinese government has striven to attract more foreign-
related arbitration cases for Chinese arbitration institutes.  As a result, China 
adopted a special legal system for foreign-related arbitration, which imitates 
the New York Convention. 
a. Grounds for Refusing Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Related Awards 
i. The New York Convention  
The core benefit of the Convention is that it limits the ability of courts 
to refuse to recognize and enforce arbitral awards; thus, making arbitration 
and arbitral awards more authoritative.  Article V of the Convention spelled 
out five grounds on which a party may invoke a request for a court to deny 
                                           
276
  See Opinions Regarding Various Issues Arising From the Application of the Civil Procedure Law 
of 1991, supra note 271, art. 304, issued by the Chinese SPC on July 14, 1992.  
277
  In fact, not long after Communist China was established, then Primer Minister Zhou En Lai  
requested the establishment of an arbitration system and Chinese arbitration institutes.  An open door 
policy was later established in order to allow foreign business to enter China after the cultural revolution, 
but before this policy came into effect, arbitration was the only available dispute resolution forum for 
foreign-related business.  This was because the Chinese courts were either not functional or did not accept 
foreign-related disputes.  See Houzhi Tang, The Road of Arbitration: A Commemorating Article for the 
50th Anniversary of the China Council for Promotion of International Trade, available at 
www.cietac.org.cn (last visited Aug. 2, 2003) (Chinese version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal). 
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recognition and enforcement of an arbitral award.278  Those five grounds can 
be summarized as follows:  (1) incapacity of parties or invalidity of the 
agreement; (2) insufficient notice or unfair deprivation of procedural rights; 
(3) disputed issues beyond the agreed scope of submission; (4) improper 
arbitral procedures or tribunal; and (5) non-binding awards.279  In addition, 
the Convention offers enforcing courts the discretionary power to refuse 
recognition and enforcement based on either of two grounds: the subject 
matter “is not capable of settlement by arbitration,” or the enforcement 
would be against public policy.280  
ii. Foreign-Related Awards in China 
Article 260 of China’s 1991 Civil Procedure Law offered four 
independent legal grounds a defendant may invoke against a petition for 
recognition and enforcement of a foreign-related arbitral award.281  Those 
four criteria are: (1) no written arbitration agreement exists; (2) notice was 
insufficient or procedural rights were unfairly deprived; (3) the arbitral 
procedure or tribunal was improper; and, (4) the disputed issues were 
beyond the agreed upon scope of arbitration or the subject matter was not 
capable of settlement by arbitration.282  In addition, Article 260 provides that 
Chinese courts may deny the recognition and enforcement of foreign-related 
arbitral awards based upon “public interest.”283  The 1994 Arbitration Law 
cited above discussed Article 260(1) as grounds for refusing recognition or 
enforcement of a foreign-related award.284  For reasons unknown, the 
“public interest” ground was not included in the 1994 Arbitration Law.  As 
Article 260(2) of the Civil Procedure Law is still a valid legal source 
however, public interest remains a legal basis that a court may cite to refuse 
enforcement or recognition of a foreign-related award. 
b. Grounds for Refusing Enforcement of Domestic Awards 
Grounds for refusing enforcement of domestic awards are regulated in 
article 217(2)-(3) of the 1991 Civil Procedure Law.285  A party may cite the 
following reasons to defend a non-enforcement request: (1) no arbitration 
                                           
278
  See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. V(1). 
279
  Id. 
280
  See id. art. V(2). 
281 
 See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 260.  
282
  See id.  
283
  See id. art. 260(2).   
284
  See 1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, art. 71.   
285
  See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 217(2), (3).  
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agreement exists; (2) disputed issues are beyond the scope of the agreement 
or the arbitral institute is not an authorized one; (3) the arbitral tribunal or 
proceeding is improper; (4) major evidence for fact determination is lacking; 
(5) there was an error “in the application of the law”; or (6) the arbitrator 
was corrupt or “perverted the law”.286  In addition, a court may cite “social 
public interest” as grounds for refusing to enforce an award.287 
c. Comparison of the Grounds for Refusal of Enforcement  
A close-up comparison reveals that the Chinese law offers more 
favorable treatment than the Convention to the recognition and enforcement 
of a “foreign-related award.”  The grounds a party may invoke for refusing 
recognition and enforcement of an award are substantially narrower than 
under the Convention.  The first ground in Article 260(1) of the Chinese 
Civil Procedure Law (no written arbitration agreement exists) is actually 
required as a prerequisite for the application of the Convention.288  The first 
ground of Article V(1) of the Convention (incapacity of parties or invalidity 
of the agreement) and the last ground (non-binding award) are not found in 
Chinese law.  
Under current Chinese law, parties are offered opportunities to 
challenge the validity of an arbitration agreement, based on the incapacity of 
a party, either at an arbitration commission or in court at an earlier stage of 
the arbitral proceeding.289  If a party does not challenge the validity of the 
arbitration agreement before the first hearing of an arbitral proceeding, the 
party will be considered to have waived the right and will not be allowed to 
raise the issue during the enforcement stage.290  Such a structure increases 
the system’s efficiency and avoids procedural abuse at the enforcement stage 
by a losing party.   
Apparently, judicial review is more stringent for domestic awards than 
for foreign-related awards.  Chinese courts may review the substantive 
issues on domestic awards, such as the evidence and application of the 
                                           
286
  Id.   
287
  Id. 
288
  See New York Convention, supra note 3, art. II(1), (2) (requiring arbitration agreement to be in 
writing to apply the Convention).  
289
  See 1994 Arbitration Law, supra note 29, art. 17 (providing that arbitration agreement entered by 
an individual of limited civil capacity or no civil capacity is invalid); see also id. art. 20 (providing that a 
party may have the court of arbitral commission determine the validity of arbitration agreement).  
290
  See id. art. 20(2) (providing that a party should raise the challenge to the validity of the arbitration 
agreement prior to the first hearing of the arbitral proceeding). 
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law.291  It is critical, therefore, that parties ensure that their arbitration is 
considered to be a “foreign-related award” in order to limit the scope of 
judicial review and the possible defenses.  
d. Public Interest v. Public Policy  
The “public interest” defense292 for the enforcement of foreign-related 
awards in Chinese law has brought intense criticism.  The term “public 
interest” is unique in Chinese law, and it is different from “public policy” in 
Article V(2)(b) of the Convention or traditional international law.  Legal 
experts have been striving to reach a universal definition for public policy 
but have found “it is difficult, if not impossible” to define the concept.293  
However, it is generally agreed that, for the purpose of the Convention, 
public policy should be construed narrowly and limited to the violation of a 
state’s “international public policy or order public international.”294  U.S. 
courts have held that the public policy defense under the Convention applies 
only when “enforcement would violate the forum state’s most basic notions 
of morality and justice.”295  Widely accepted factors that may be invoked as 
violations of international public policy include, but are not limited to: 
biased arbitrators, lack of reasons for the award, serious irregularities in the 
arbitration procedure, allegations of illegality, corruption or fraud, the award 
of punitive damages and the breach of competition law.296 
The term “pubic interest” is different from the term "public policy," 
and the former appears to be broader than “basic notions of morality and 
                                           
291
  See id. art. 58 (providing grounds that a court may revoke a domestic arbitral award).  Cf. id. art. 
70 (providing the grounds that a court may revoke a foreign-related award).  
292
  See  1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 260(2).  
293
  See LEW, supra note 3, at 722-23 (listing definitions offered by courts from different countries). 
294
  International public policy is different from domestic public policy.  French NCPC Articles 1498 
and 1502 regulated the international public policy and has been influential around the world.  See id. at 721 
& n. 173.  
295
  See Parsons & Whittemore Overseas Co. v. Société Générale de l'Industrie du Papier, 508 F.2d 
969, 974 (2d Cir. 1974) (finding that allowing the “public policy defense as a parochial device protective of 
national political interests would seriously undermine the Convention's utility” and “national policy” does 
not equate to public); see also Karaha Bodas Co. v. Perusahaan Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi 
Negara, 364 F.3d 274, 306 (5th Cir. 2004) (reaching narrow reading of the public policy defense and 
finding that “[e]rroneous legal reasoning or misapplication of law is generally not a violation of public 
policy within the meaning of the New York Convention.”).  
296
  See LEW, supra note 3, at 722-23.  Efforts to unify the definition of public policy were made by 
the International Law Association Committee on International Commercial Arbitration.  A report and a 
resolution on public policy as a bar to the enforcement of foreign arbitration awards were published 
containing a guideline for the classification of public policy grounds.  See ILA Committee on International 
Commercial Arbitration, Interim Report on Public Policy as a Bar to the Enforcement of International 
Arbitral Awards, in LONDON CONFERENCE REPORT 4-5 (2000) (on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy 
Journal).  
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justice.”  Public interest may include any financial, cultural, environmental, 
or other interest as long as it is public, and not isolated to a small group.297  
Technically, any enforcement may have a substantial impact on the financial 
situation of an interest group, and the public interest defense may therefore 
be abused as a ground for defending arbitral awards.  This wide-open ground 
offered a convenient channel for local protectionists in China.298   
The concern is more than a hypothetical discussion; rather it has 
become a real threat: a Chinese court refused to enforce a CIETAC foreign-
related award on pubic interest grounds because the court believed that 
enforcement would severely impact the national economy, damage social 
pubic interest, and impact the nation’s foreign trade order.299  Although the 
decision was eventually reversed by the SPC, the SPC ruling addressed only 
the particular situation in the case and did not offer a general definition of 
“public interest.”300  Although the 1994 Arbitration Law does not include 
pubic interest as a ground that a court can cite to deny enforcement of a 
foreign-related award, the law does not overwrite the pubic interest grounds 
provided in the 1991 Civil Procedure Law.  Public interest, therefore, 
remains a legal ground that courts may cite to refuse an enforcement 
request.301 
3. Reporting System for Foreign-Related Awards and Convention Awards 
In many respects, China has attempted to treat foreign-related awards 
as quasi-Convention awards.  To promote international arbitration, China has 
offered foreign-related arbitration treatment that is more favorable than 
treatment under the New York Convention.  Exercising its implementing 
power, the SPC established a reporting/approval system for both foreign-
related arbitral awards and foreign arbitral awards (including Convention 
Awards).302  The reporting system requires that a lower court’s decision 
                                           
297
  See HU LI, 《 国 国国国国国国及 国 国强际 际 特 特及国国国国特中国及 国 国强别 际 》: [ENFORCEMENT OF THE 
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AWARD: WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE ENFORCEMENT OF 
THE ARBITRAL AWARD IN THE P. R. CHINA] 148 (2000) (citing the violation of sovereignty, damage to 
natural resources, serious contamination to the environment, threat to public health or safety, or corruption 
of morality as possible violations of social public interest and resulting in the refusal of enforcing an 
arbitral award).  
298
  See id. at 148 (citing Kaifen Dongfeng Clothing Factory v. Henan Clothing Import & Export 
(Group) Co.).  
299
  Id.  
300
  See id.  The case was also reported in Michael J. Moser, China and the Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards, 61 ARB. 50-51 (1995).  
301
  1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 260(2).   
302
  See [SPC], Notice of the SPC Concerning the Handling of Foreign-Related Arbitration and 
Foreign Arbitration, (Aug. 28, 1995) (Chinese version on file with Pacific Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
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denying enforcement of a foreign-related award or a foreign award must be 
approved by the SPC.303  In detail, an IPC must report to an appropriate HPC 
for approval when the IPC intends to refuse enforcement of a foreign-related 
award or a foreign award.304  If the HPC agrees with the lower court’s 
refusal opinion, the HPC must report to the SPC for a final review and 
approval.  The IPC cannot enter a decision to refuse enforcement unless and 
until the SPC approves the opinion.305 
Though the reporting system has been criticized for its ineffective 
procedure and limited application,306 the new system clearly reflects the 
SPC’s positive attitude towards foreign-related arbitration: a standard that is 
equal to or more favorable than the Convention. 
C. Foreign Invested Companies and the Convention 
1. Legal Status of Foreign Invested Companies in China 
The majority of foreign direct investments (“FDI”) in China are in the 
form of joint venture companies (“JVCs”) or wholly foreign owned 
enterprise (“WFOE”) companies, both of which are considered to be entities 
of Chinese nationality according to Chinese law.307  A JVC or a WFOE is not 
considered a foreign party in litigation; thus, the case is not considered a 
foreign-related case if no other independent foreign factors are involved.308  
Therefore, disputes between two foreign invested companies or between a 
                                           
303
  Id.  
304
  See id.  In China, IPCs are the courts of jurisdiction for enforcing foreign-related awards and 
intermediate courts are the courts of jurisdiction for enforcing Convention awards or other foreign awards 
in China.  See 1991 Civil Procedure Law, supra note 22, art. 258, 269.   
305
  See Notice of SPC Concerning the Handling of Foreign Awards, supra note 302. 
306
  See Randall Peerenboom, The Evolving Regulatory Framework for Enforcement of Arbitral 
Awards in the People’s Republic of China, 1 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 12, 28-30 (2000) (reporting that the 
SPC "denied 80% of the requests to refuse enforcement" and criticizing the system’s exclusion of foreign 
ad hoc arbitration, the lack of a procedure to supervise non-reported but not enforced cases, and limited 
application to foreign invested companies).  
307
  See Regulations for the Implementation of the Equity Joint Venture Law of the People's Republic 
of China, promulgated by the State Council on Sept. 20, 1983.  Article 100 was amended by the State 
Council on January 15, 1986, 1 CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN BUS.: BUS. REG. ¶ 6-550 (CCH), art. 2; see also 
Wholly Foreign Owned Enterprise Law of the People's Republic of China, adopted by the Fourth Session 
of the Sixth NPC and promulgated by the President of China on Apr. 12, 1986, 2 CHINA L. FOR FOREIGN 
BUS.: BUS. REG. ¶ 13-506 (CCH), art. 8; Company Law of PRC, art. 18; General Principles of Civil Law of 
People’s Republic of China (also known as Civil Principle Code of People’s Republic China) (adopted by 
Fourth Session of the Sixth People’s Congress of China on Apr. 2, 1986 and published on Apr. 12, 1986 by 
the No. 37 President Order with effective date set on Jan. 1, 1987) art. 37, 41(2), available at 
http://en.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=2696 (last visited February, 18 2006)  
308
  See supra note 276 and accompanying text.  
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foreign invested company and a Chinese domestic company, without other 
foreign connections, are considered domestic cases.   
2. Foreign Investment Companies in Arbitration Proceedings 
In terms of arbitration, Chinese courts follow the “company’s 
nationality rule”: a JVC or a WFOE is not considered a foreign party but a 
Chinese company; arbitration involving JVCs or WFOEs, if no other 
qualified foreign connection exists, will not be considered foreign-related.309  
In a widely cited 1992 enforcement case, China International Engineering v. 
Lido, the Beijing IPC ruled that a JVC established under Chinese law was a 
Chinese legal entity and the fact that the JVC was a party in an arbitration 
proceeding did not qualify the case as “foreign-related.”310  The court found 
that the parties in Lido were both legal Chinese entities and no other foreign 
element was involved.  The court further determined that CIETAC, which 
then only handled foreign arbitration cases, did not have jurisdiction over 
any domestic cases and thus refused to enforce the CIETAC award.311 
Though entirely controlled by foreign investors, WFOEs, like JVCs, 
are not considered foreign legal parties in Chinese arbitration proceedings.  
In 2001, Beijing No. 2 IPC ruled in Amcor v. China that a dispute involving 
a WFOE and a Chinese domestic company did not qualify as foreign-related 
arbitration.312  In Amcor, the WFOE (Amcor) challenged the Beijing 
Arbitration Commission’s award on the ground that the commission failed to 
apply foreign-related procedure to the arbitration.313  The Court found that 
                                           
309
  China Int’l Eng’g Consultancy Co. v. Lido Hotel of Beijing (1992, Beijing Intermediate People’s 
Court).  The case was to enforce a CIETAC arbitral award against Lido Hotel, a joint venture company 
invested by a Hong Kong company and a Chinese company.  The Lido case triggered the CIETAC to 
amend its arbitration rules in 1998 to expand its jurisdiction to cover foreign joint venture disputes, even 
when the foreign joint venture is a Chinese legal person.  Reported and recited in Hu Li, supra note 297, at 
146-47; see also MO, supra note 58, at 59-60; Randall Peerenboom, Seek Truth From Facts: An Empirical 
Study of Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in the PRC, 49 AM. J. COMP. L. 249, 280 (2001) (discussing the 
Lido case and its impact). 
310
  HU LI, supra note 297, at 146-147. 
311
  See id. at 147; see also 1988 Arbitration Rules of CIETAC (Chinese version on file with Pacific 
Rim Law & Policy Journal). 
312
  Amcor Flexible Packing (Beijing) Co. (安安安 安安安安安安安安软 ) v. China No. 22nd Metallurgy 
Constr. Co. (中国中中中中中中中 安安设 ) (Beijing No. 2 Intermediate Court Civil Order, docket No. (2001) 
Erzhongjinzhongzi No. 1640), available at http://www.bjac.org.cn (last visited on Nov. 9, 2003).  
313
  Amcor challenged on the grounds that Amcor is a foreign invested company and contains a 
foreign element, and so the dispute should be arbitrated by qualified arbitrators for foreign-related cases 
and not by a general arbitrator.  See id.  The Beijing Arbitration Commission maintains different lists of 
arbitrators for domestic disputes and foreign-related disputes.  For foreign-related cases, the commission 
should deliver a list of eligible arbitrators to the parties.  The 1999 version is applicable to Amcor.  See 
Beijing Arbitration Commission Arbitration Rules (1999 Version), art. 72, available at 
http://www.bjac.org.cn (last visited Jan. 8, 2004).  
452 PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL VOL. 15 NO. 2 
 
Amcor was a Chinese legal entity and the arbitration proceeding did not 
qualify as a foreign-related arbitration.  Thus, the arbitration tribunal’s 
application of domestic procedure complied with the 1994 Arbitration Law 
and the Procedure Rules of the Beijing Arbitration Commission.314 
3. Criticism and Comment 
Preventing foreign invested companies from applying favorable 
foreign-related arbitration procedures and rules exposes foreign investors to 
risk.  Domestic arbitration awards in China are subject to stricter scrutiny 
and broader review in the courts.  When foreign investors choose arbitration 
with the intention of skipping the uncertainty of Chinese courts, excluding 
foreign invested companies from applying foreign-related rules and laws 
upsets the foreign investors’ major goal.  This drawback discounts the value 
of arbitration to foreign investors in China and disables a dispute resolution 
channel that is valuable to foreign business.  The drawback will not only 
negatively impact the investment environment in China, but will also paint 
China in a less favorable light for the purpose of international arbitration.   
VI. CONCLUSION  
Case studies and theoretical analyses demonstrate that intervention 
from domestic courts has significantly impacted the application of the New 
York Convention.  While appropriate and positive intervention promotes 
arbitration and international business, inappropriate court intervention 
damages international arbitration, and in turn, negatively impacts 
international business.  Striking an appropriate balance of intervention in 
international arbitration is a challenging task for domestic courts.  In 
offering universal rules for domestic courts, the New York Convention has 
achieved unprecedented success.  However, achieving the goals set by the 
Convention depends heavily on the implementation process in domestic 
courts.  As a result of the ambiguity of the original Convention language and 
the variation between domestic implementation systems and judicial 
discretion, achievement of a universal application of the New York 
Convention is far from a reality.   
Studies have shown that domestic courts could effectively diminish or 
expand the benefits of the New York Convention by strategically limiting or 
expanding the scope of its application.  Though originally purporting to 
implement a set of universal rules, the New York Convention leaves 
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  See Notice of SPC Concerning the Handling of Foreign Awards, supra note 302, art. 1. 
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contracting states with broad discretion over domestic implementation 
procedures.  The substantive standards and legal grounds set in the 
Convention are clear, and there is little room for domestic courts to exercise 
interpretation.  However, domestic courts have broad discretion in 
determining the application and scope of the Convention.   
In general, the discretion of local courts can be classified into two 
categories: macro, and micro level discretion.  At the macro level, domestic 
courts interpret reciprocal rules, Convention wording, and domestic 
implementation rules.  Examples of decisions from courts with macro 
discretion are the U.S. court’s ruling in Lander and the Chinese SPC’s 
exclusion of non-domestic awards category from the application of New 
York Convention.  At the micro level, individual courts may use a single 
factor to distort legislative intention, as illustrated in Jones.  
Theoretically, U.S. courts have greater discretion at the micro level on 
the application and scope of the Convention than do Chinese courts.  This is 
because the New York Convention does not apply directly in U.S. courts but 
through domestic legislation.  The domestic implementation legislation, the 
Convention Act, takes a different approach than the Convention to classify 
qualified awards, leaving domestic courts room to manipulate ambiguous 
language in the legislation.  In addition, U.S. courts that maintain high levels 
of judicial independence have some ability to formulate their own rules on 
certain issues.  Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court is generally 
reluctant to unify international treaty issues involving interests of different 
domestic private groups.  
Unlike the law in the United States, in China, international 
conventions are directly applicable and are superior to any conflicting 
domestic laws or regulations.  In addition, the Chinese SPC has frequently 
offered judicial interpretations, applicable in all courts nationwide, 
concerning the New York Convention.  Furthermore, the Chinese SPC has 
established a pre-approval system that requires any denial of the application 
of the New York Convention to be reviewed by the SPC.   
In general, the U.S. Congress and courts have been in favor of 
international arbitration.  For example, the U.S. Convention Act has been 
largely considered an instrument aimed at promoting international 
arbitration agreements and awards.  The detailed implementation of the New 
York Convention in the United States however, is discounted by 
inappropriate judicial intervention.  Amplified by Jones, the ambiguity of the 
U.S. domestic legislation further complicates courts’ implementation of the 
New York Convention.  Additionally, an individual court’s misinterpretation 
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of § 202 seriously jeopardizes the predictability of the application of the 
Convention. 
To improve predictability and comply with the Convention obligation, 
two immediate remedial options are available to the United States.  First, 
Congress could pass clarifying legislation on § 202 that clearly states that 
the foreign connection requirement limits only non-domestic awards, and 
that the Convention is applicable to any award entered in the territory of a 
foreign contracting state.  Alternatively, the Supreme Court could grant 
certiorari on a case in order to overrule Jones and clarify that § 202 is 
consistent with the New York Convention. 
New, clarifying legislation is the most practical option because a U.S. 
Supreme Court ruling on the issue is unlikely unless there is a significant 
change in the economy, such as surge of international disputes in the United 
States.  Of course, individual circuit courts may take initiative to abandon 
the Jones rule, but it would be hard to reach a national consensus in this way.  
There is little doubt that the Chinese judicial commitment to 
implement the New York Convention is strong, especially in the SPC and the 
HPCs.  The SPC’s active intervention on international commercial 
arbitration however, has not always been positive.  Several judicial 
interpretations have significantly impacted international commercial 
arbitration in a negative manner.  For example, the SPC does not consider 
foreign invested companies in China to be foreign actors in arbitration cases 
and they are therefore treated as domestic companies in such proceedings.  
U.S. businesses have been very concerned with this issue.315  If foreign 
invested companies are treated as domestic companies in arbitration 
proceedings, arbitration in China will lose most of its value to foreign 
invested enterprises.  Domestic arbitral awards are subject to the Chinese 
courts’ substantive review during enforcement.  Even worse, in the most 
recently published draft version of the 2003 SPC Provisions, the SPC 
attempted to prohibit domestically incorporated companies (including 
foreign invested companies) from arbitrating abroad without a foreign-
related factor.316  Thus, foreign invested enterprises may be denied access to 
the New York Convention through arbitration in a foreign country.317   
To solve this issue, the Chinese SPC should reclassify foreign 
invested companies as foreign companies, rather than as domestic 
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  See American Chamber of Commerce-China, Chinese Version [Commentary on the Draft SPC 
Provisions on Handling by People’s Court of Foreign-Related Arbitrations and Arbitrations Adjudicated 
Abroad], available at www.AmCham-China.org.cn (last visited May 15, 2006).  
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  See 2003 SPC Provisions (draft), supra note 62, art. 20.  
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  See American Chamber of Commerce-China, supra note 315, art. 27 (comments).  
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companies, using its power of judicial interpretation.  Such special treatment 
would not offer foreign invested companies a more favored position than 
domestic companies, because foreign businesses are disadvantaged in 
accessing unfamiliar Chinese domestic rules.  In addition, such special 
treatment is necessary because the Chinese SPC has excluded domestically 
entered awards from the application of the New York Convention.   
Finally, the Chinese legislature should amend and unify its rules for 
the recognition and enforcement of foreign-related awards.  The current 
discrepancies between the Civil Procedure Law and the 1994 Arbitration 
Law, and between Chinese rules and the Convention standards, cause 
unnecessary complication and yield no significant benefit.  Comparative 
analyses have shown that the standards set for recognition and enforcement 
of foreign-related awards in China do not substantively differ from the rules 
of the New York Convention.  The only issue of significance is the special 
term of “public interest” in Article 260(2) of the Civil Procedure Law, which 
is considered to be different from the term “public policy” in the 
Convention.  However, the later enacted 1994 Arbitration Law has 
abandoned the “public interest” provision.  Though the 1994 Arbitration 
Law does not necessarily invalidate Article 260(2), it is clearly indicative of 
legislative intention.  It is time therefore, for the Chinese legislature to 
amend Article 260 in order to fully incorporate the New York Convention’s 
standards. 
